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Banque centrale et système bancaire : les débats anglais au début du XIXe siècle

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  • Sylvie Diatkine

Abstract

[fre] Ricardo et Thornton s'accordent sur le rôle d'une banque spécifique assurant la stabilité de la valeur de la monnaie en référence au prix de l'or et au taux de change. Selon Ricardo, les interventions de la banque sur le marché de l'or sont nécessaires pour en limiter les fluctuations autour d'une cible préalablement établie. Ils sont cependant tous deux préoccupés d'assurer une flexibilité suffisante de l'offre de monnaie par rapport aux réserves métalliques, soit dans le cadre de règles originales, qui se distinguent de celles de l'école monétariste et qui s'imposent à une banque institut d'émission unique (Ricardo), soit dans le cadre d'une politique discrétionnaire (Thornton). Pour ce dernier, la nécessité de la fonction de prêteur ultime justifie une structure bancaire hiérarchisée autour d'une banque centrale permettant d'assurer la confiance dans la continuité du système des paiements, grâce à un niveau suffisant de liquidité. [eng] Ricardo and Thornton are mainly concerned with the responsability of a specific bank in maintaining the value of money in conformity with the price of gold and the rate of exchange. According to Ricardo, this bank has to intervene on the market of gold in order to stabilize it at the level of a fixed target. However, for both authors, notes issuing is not strictly tied to the quantity of gold in the coffers of the bank either by following rules, distinct from the monetarist ones, but imposed to a unique bank of issue (Ricardo), or through a discretionnary monetary policy (Thornton). For the latter, the need for a lender in last resort is related to a hierarchization in banking systems with the central bank sustaining all payments in the country and insuring confidence by providing a sufficient amount of liquidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Diatkine, 1998. "Banque centrale et système bancaire : les débats anglais au début du XIXe siècle," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(2), pages 201-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_2_1055
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1998.1055
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ghislain Deleplace, 1994. "Aux origines de la pensée monétaire moderne," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(5), pages 1125-1136.
    2. Jerome de Boyer, 1998. "Endogenous money and shareholders' funds in the classical theory of banking," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 60-84.
    3. Annalisa Rosselli, 1999. "The Origin of the Political Economy of Money," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 443-454.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
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