IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1992_num_43_2_409352.html

Concurrence imparfaite et stratégie bancaire

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Charles Rochet

Abstract

[fre] Concurrence imparfaite et stratégie bancaire. . Nous modélisons les comportements des banques commerciales en utilisant la méthodologie des jeux séquentiels. Nous distinguons trois types de stratégies:. - les stratégies de court terme (activités de marché) ;. - les stratégies de moyen terme (activités clientèle) ;. - les stratégies de long terme (investissements physiques).. Les principaux résultats obtenus sont les suivants :. -contrairement aux résultats de Pyle-Hart Jaffee, les portefeuilles de titres détenus à l'équilibre par les banques sont hétérogènes et peuvent se décomposer en portefeuilles de couverture (liés à l'activité clientèle) et en portefeuilles de placement ;. -les parts de marché dans l'activité clientèle (dépôts et crédits) sont croissantes avec les investissements physiques réalisés et décroissantes avec le coefficient d'aversion au risque des actionnaires ;. -les équilibres de long terme sont en général asymétriques, certaines banques choisissant des investissements physiques importants, alors que d'autres se contentent d'investissements minimaux. [eng] Imperfect competition and banking strategy J.-C. Rochet. . We model banking competition through a sequential game, with three types of strategies : . - portfolio activities . - deposits and loans activities (medium run) . - physical investments (long run) . Our main results are the following : . - contrarily to the classical results of Pyle-Hart Jaffee, banks hold heteregenous portfolios which can be split into hedging portfolios (linked to the deposits and loans activity) and investment portfolios. . -market shares in deposits and loans increase with physical investments and decrease with risk aversion of banks. . -long run equilibria are in general asymmetric.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Charles Rochet, 1992. "Concurrence imparfaite et stratégie bancaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(2), pages 261-276.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1992_num_43_2_409352
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1992_num_43_2_409352
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1980. "Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 327-338, April.
    2. Hahn, F H, 1971. "Equilibrium with Transaction Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(3), pages 417-439, May.
    3. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    4. Pyle, David H, 1971. "On the Theory of Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 737-747, June.
    5. Oliver D. Hart & Dwight M. Jaffee, 1974. "On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 129-147.
    6. Heggestad, Arnold A, 1977. "Market Structure, Risk and Profitability in Commercial Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1207-1216, September.
    7. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Franck Martin, 1995. "Concurrence bancaire, jeux séquentiels et information complète," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 301-324.
    2. Emmanuelle Nys, 2008. "Service provision and loans : Price and risk implications," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(3), pages 411-428.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maxime C. Cohen & Alexandre Jacquillat & Haotian Song, 2023. "Price Discrimination and Inventory Allocation in Bertrand Competition," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 148-167, January.
    2. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1996. "Product line competition in vertically differentiated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 389-414, May.
    3. Heidelmeier, Lisa & Sahm, Marco, 2025. "Environmental awards in a duopoly with green consumers," BERG Working Paper Series 207, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    4. Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 1995. "Duopoly and quality standards," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 71-82, January.
    5. L. Lambertini & P. Tedeschi, 2003. "Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Working Papers 492, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    6. Hélène Latzer, 2016. "Beyond the Arrow effect: a Schumpeterian theory of multi-quality firms ," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01387266, HAL.
    7. Erik Gronqvist & Douglas Lundin, 2009. "Incentives for clinical trials," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(5), pages 513-531.
    8. Corchón Luis Carlos & Zudenkova Galina, 2013. "The Welfare Effects of Location and Quality in Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1143-1178, July.
    9. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2017. "Horizontal mergers and product quality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1063-1103, November.
    10. Bing Jing, 2006. "On the Profitability of Firms in a Differentiated Industry," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 248-259, 05-06.
    11. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola, 2012. "Product innovation and firms’ ownership," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 323-343, April.
    12. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 2022. "Differentiated Entry or “Me-Too” Entry in Bertrand and Cournot Oligopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-27, February.
    13. Greaney, Theresa M., 1997. "A model of decentralized multinational investment in product development activities," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 315-333, August.
    14. Harald Gruber, 1995. "Strategic Process And Product Innovation," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 17-26.
    15. Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Didier Laussel, 2024. "Random Informative Advertising with Vertically Differentiated Products," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-29, March.
    16. A. Auer, Raphael & Chaney, Thomas & Sauré, Philip, 2018. "Quality pricing-to-market," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 87-102.
    17. Bonanno, Giacomo & Haworth, Barry, 1998. "Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 495-510, July.
    18. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    19. Doris Neuberger, 1991. "Risk taking by banks and captial accumulation: A portfolio approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 283-303, October.
    20. Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Martinez, Jorge Rosell, 2011. "The Quality-Quantity Trade-off in the Principal-Agent Framework," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 11(01), pages 1-12, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1992_num_43_2_409352. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.