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Équilibres non walrasiens et négociations salariales

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  • Pierre Cahuc

Abstract

[fre] Equilibres non walrasiens et négociations salariales. . Cet article endogénéise le salaire réel dans un modèle d'équilibres avec rationnements. Le salaire résulte de négociations entre les salariés représentés par un syndicat et une entreprise. La relation emploi-salaire est différente selon les régimes de déséquilibres et l'apparition de ces régimes est contingente au rapport de force entre les protagonistes. L'impact des variations de la demande autonome, des encaisses monétaires, des allocations chômage et du pouvoir syndical est différent dans chaque régime. [eng] Wage bargaining with non walrasian equilibria . . This paper deals whith the determination of the real wage in a macroeconomic model with rationing. The real wage is determined by a bargaining between an union reprensenting workers and a firm. The wage employment relation is specifie in every disequilibrium regime and the apparition of the regimes depends on the bargaining power of the protagonists. The effects of changes in autonomous spending, quantity of money, unemployment benefits, and union power are different in every regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc, 1988. "Équilibres non walrasiens et négociations salariales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(4), pages 705-724.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1988_num_39_4_409094
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