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Marchés publics et innovation : concurrence ou régulation ?

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  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard

Abstract

[eng] The governance of contractual relations competition or regulation ?. Jean-Pierre Ponssard. In his recent work, Williamson develops an argumentation to choose between different frameworks to govern contractual relations depending on various characteristics of the underlying transactions. His normative implications are based on the comparative efficiency of the transaction costs. In particular he argues that competitive bidding would be either unpractical or subject to major inefficiencies in case of a long term transaction requiring adaptation due to uncertainty in demand and production functions at the contracting stage. The objective of this paper is to pursue this kind of thought in view of the empirical data collected on the contractual relations that were actually used for the procurement of a similar electronic System both by the Défense Department and a Civil Agency in France. It is argued that the procurement policies selected by each administration were not the result of economic considerations contingent on this equipment but that they should be understood in a more global long term institutional perspective. Then the characteristics of the on going transaction (such as uncertainty, capital and human specific investmerit, long term versus short term) were more side pro-ducts of the procurement policy than exogeneously determined. [fre] Dans ses travaux récents, Williamson développe une grille d'analyse pour choisir entre différentes modalités permettant de gérer les relations contractuelles sur la base de leurs avantages comparatifs en termes de coût de transaction. En particu­lier, il suggère que la concurrence classique par appel d'offres peut être la source de nombreuses inefficacités dans le cas d'une relation de longue durée soumise à des nécessités d'adaptation du fait d'une demande ou de moyens de production encore incertains au moment de la signature du contrat. L'objet de cette note est de poursuivre cette réflexion à partir d'une série d'études empiriques menées en France sur les achats industriels de ministères techniques. Un exemple rapporté en détail illustre le fait que les politiques d'achat relèvent plus d'une analyse institutionnelle globale que de considérations économiques spécifiques à tel ou tel équipement industriel.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1981. "Marchés publics et innovation : concurrence ou régulation ?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 163-179.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1981_num_32_1_408586
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1981.408586
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1981.408586
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kamien, Morton I & Schwartz, Nancy L, 1975. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-37, March.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    3. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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    1. Dalpé, Robert & DeBresson, Christian, 1989. "Le secteur public comme premier utilisateur d’innovations," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 65(1), pages 53-70, mars.

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