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A note on politics and franchise bidding

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  • Robert Ekelund
  • Richard Saba

Abstract

To sum up, one problem posed by critics of franchise bidding is that the unfavorable political participation associated with the present system of regulation would only be accentuated under a franchise scheme. However, we have argued to the contrary that under a franchising scheme political interest could be particularized at the local level. Restricting the franchising body's influence to a specific utility serving a local area decreases monetary cost and increases the incentive of the local regulator to act in the interest of the local constituency. Market forces then would be more active in policing both the franchising body and the firm providing the services. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Ekelund & Richard Saba, 1981. "A note on politics and franchise bidding," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 343-348, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:2:p:343-348
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00138254
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. & Edward O. Price III, 1979. "Sir Edwin Chadwick on Competition and the Social Control of Industry: Railroads," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 213-239, Summer.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1972. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 98-129, Spring.
    3. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    4. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    5. Robert M. Spann & Edward W. Erickson, 1970. "The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 227-244, Autumn.
    6. Urban, Raymond & Mancke, Richard B, 1972. "Federal Regulation of Whiskey Labelling: From the Repeal of Prohibition to the Present," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 411-426, October.
    7. Victor P. Goldberg, 1977. "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 250-261, Spring.
    8. De Vany, Arthur S & Saving, Thomas R, 1977. "Product Quality, Uncertainty, and Regulation: The Trucking Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 583-594, September.
    9. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Tollison, Robert D, 1980. "Economic Regulation in Mercantile England: Heckscher Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(4), pages 567-599, October.
    10. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donald J. Boudreaux and Robert B. Ekelund, 1994. "Cable Regulation," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 14(1), pages 87-107, Spring/Su.

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