IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

La théorie économique de l'auto-protection


  • Jean-Jacques Laffont


[fre] L'objet de cette note est de prendre en compte le phénomène d'autoprotection dans une théorie des assurances d'équilibre général. Après avoir mis en évidence la possibilité d'inexistence de l'équilibre concurrentiel et son inefficacité très générale, lorsqu'il existe, nous étudions des politiques économiques susceptibles de rétablir l'optimalité parétienne : prime variable liée à l'activité d'autoprotection, prime variable liée à la quantité d'assurance sélectionnée, prime définie sur la base des déclarations de l'agent et contrôlée par une cour de justice, etc. [eng] The economic theory of self-protection. . The purpose of this paper is to take info account self'protection in a general equilibrium theory of Insurance. First, we show why the competitive equilibrium may fait to exist and why it is in general Pareto inefficient, when it cxists. Then, we study a number of economic policies designed to restore Pareto efficiency : Insurance premium variable with the level of self~protection, with the quantity of Insurance, Insurance premium defined on the basis of the agent's declarations, etc.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1976. "La théorie économique de l'auto-protection," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 27(4), pages 561-588.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1976_num_27_4_408274
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1976.408274

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Malinvaud, E., 1972. "The allocation of individual risks in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 312-328, April.
    2. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    3. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    4. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    5. Malinvaud, E, 1973. "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 383-410, May.
    6. Green, Jerry & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1975. "Competitive inefficiencies in the presence of constrained transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 343-357, June.
    7. Gould, John P, 1969. "The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Selection of Optimal Deductibles for a Given Insurance Policy," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 143-151, April.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. François-Régis Mahieu, 1989. "Principes économiques et sociétés africaines," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 30(120), pages 725-753.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1976_num_27_4_408274. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.