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Conseils aux pays émergents sur la crise actuelle : quoi de neuf ? qu’est-ce qui a changé ? pourquoi ?

Author

Listed:
  • Marcos Chamon
  • Christopher Crowe
  • Atish R. Ghosh
  • Jun Kim
  • Jonathan D. Ostry

Abstract

[fre] La politique de conseils du FMI aux pays émergents pendant cette crise a été différente de celle des crises précédentes. Mais ces différences sont principalement dues aux changements de circonstances. De nombreux pays émergents vivent la crise comme un choc totalement exogène : les fondamentaux intérieurs sont solides et des institutions améliorées facilitent un assouplissement discrétionnaire et crédible des politiques économiques. Les recommandations du FMI pour ces pays ont donc été assez proches de celles prodiguées en l’absence de crise, mettant l’accent sur des politiques contra-cycliques quand cela était possible. Certains de ces pays ont également bénéficié de nouvelles procédures de prêts qui permettent de restaurer la confiance en cas de crise. Toutefois, pour les pays dont les vulnérabilités intérieures sont importantes, les recommandations plus traditionnelles du FMI - réductions des déséquilibres extérieurs combinées à des politiques d’austérité et des réformes structurelles ciblées - sont apparues indiquées, même si l’augmentation des modalités de prêts et de ressources peuvent permettre à ces pays une mise en oeuvre des ajustements nécessaires à des coûts inférieurs en termes d’impact économique et social. . Classification JEL : N1, E6, F4. [eng] Policy advice to emerging market countries in the current crisis : what’s new ? what’s different ? why ? . IMF policy advice to EMEs in this crisis has been differed from that provided in previous EME crises. But these differences are largely driven by changed circumstances. Many EMEs are experiencing the current crisis as a wholly exogenous shock : domestic fundamentals are sound, and an improved institutional environment has facilitated credible discretionary policy loosening. The IMF’s policy advice for these countries is therefore closer to the advice in non-crisis periods, stressing countercyclical policy responses where feasible. Some of these countries have also benefited from new precautionary lending arrangements that can restore confidence before a crisis occurs. However, for countries with deeper-seated domestic vulnerabilities, more « traditional » IMF policy advice-reducing external imbalances through policy restraint and targeted structural reforms-appears to be warranted, although the augmentation of the IMF’s lending toolkit and resources should allow these countries to achieve the necessary adjustment at lower cost in terms of economic and social impact. . Classification JEL : N1, E6, F4.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos Chamon & Christopher Crowe & Atish R. Ghosh & Jun Kim & Jonathan D. Ostry, 2009. "Conseils aux pays émergents sur la crise actuelle : quoi de neuf ? qu’est-ce qui a changé ? pourquoi ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 95(2), pages 307-323.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2009_num_95_2_5359
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2009.5359
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2009.5359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Ethan Ilzetzki & Carlos A. Vegh, 2008. "Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Truth or Fiction?," NBER Working Papers 14191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance

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