IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Quinze ans de restructuration bancaire dans la CEMAC : qu’avons-nous appris ?

Listed author(s):
  • Désiré Avo
  • Sylvie Marie-Louise Eyeffa Ekomo
Registered author(s):

    [eng] Fifteen years of banking restructuring in CEMAC : what have we learnt ? Member countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) experienced a severe economic crisis since the 80’ s. As a consequence of this prolonged crisis, the portfolio of commercial banks dramatically deteriorated, therefore pushing monetary authorities and international community to envisage a restructuring strategy for the banking sector. The aim of this strategy was to stabilize the banking sector by improving financing channels and mechanisms. In this paper we show that the reforms implemented to restructure the banking sector, far from having improved financing mechanisms, have led to the emergence of three paradoxes : excessive liquidity of the system coupled with credit rationing, banking concentration and contemporaneous development of microfinance structures and foreign penetration in the banking sector without development of financial innovations. Classification JEL : G21, G34, N27 [fre] Les pays de la Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale (CEMAC) ont connu, à partir du début des années 1980, une grave crise économique. Les conséquences de celle-ci se sont traduites, sur le secteur bancaire, par une dégradation rapide et brutale du portefeuille des banques. En réponse à cette crise, les autorités monétaires, avec l’appui de la communauté financière internationale ont engagé une politique de restructuration bancaire. Cette politique avait pour objectif d’assurer un retour à la stabilité bancaire en améliorant les circuits de financement. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer, après avoir présenté les différentes réformes qui ont été mises en oeuvre, que les restructurations bancaires, au lieu d’assurer le financement de l’économie, ont plutôt conduit à des paradoxes dont trois sont particulièrement développés. Il s’agit de : la surliquidité et le rationnement du crédit ; la concentration bancaire et le développement de la microfinance et enfin l’internationalisation bancaire sans développement des innovations financières. Classification JEL : G21, G34, N27

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

    Volume (Year): 89 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 183-205

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2007_num_89_3_4297
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2007.4297
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    in new window

    1. Ndikumana, Leonce, 2005. "Financial development, financial structure, and domestic investment: International evidence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 651-673, June.
    2. Singh, Ajit, 1998. "Asian capitalism and the financial crisis," MPRA Paper 54932, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ross Levine, 1997. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 688-726, June.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    6. Esther Jeffers & Valérie Oheix, 2003. "Concurrence et concentration bancaires en Europe," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 72(3), pages 223-242.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    8. Chang, Ha-Joon & Park, Hong-Jae & Yoo, Chul Gyue, 1998. "Interpreting the Korean Crisis: Financial Liberalisation, Industrial Policy and Corporate Governance," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(6), pages 735-746, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2007_num_89_3_4297. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.