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Monnaies parallèles provinciales et fédéralisme budgétaire en Argentine

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  • Stéphane Colliac

Abstract

[eng] Provincial quasi-monies and fiscal federalism in Argentina . Since July 2001, the Argentineans provinces emitted a large amount of quasi-monies. This manifestation of the structural difficulties rises from the imperfect organization of the Argentinean fiscal federalism. The separation of powers between the federal State and the provinces seems inadequate, since the provinces have an influence on the legitimate prerogatives of the federal authority. The excessive power of the provinces results in a recurring monetary competition which weakens the national currency and which is only the reflection of an institutional bursting. The notes, emitted by the provinces, provided a partial function of means of payment. One, however, could see in the quasi-monies, the solution to define the new monetary regime. It seems that those are misled. It would rather be necessary to tackle the institutional inconsistencies of the Argentinean federalism, to ensure the viability of the new monetary order. . JEL classification : H77, E49, N16, D79 [fre] L’Argentine a connu, à partir de juillet 2001, un phénomène massif d’émission de monnaies parallèles provinciales. Cette émission découle de l’imparfaite organisation du fédéralisme budgétaire argentin. Dans ce cadre, la séparation des pouvoirs entre l’État et les provinces est déséquilibrée, puisque les provinces ont une influence sur des sujets qui relèvent normalement du pouvoir fédéral. Le pouvoir excessif des provinces se traduit par une concurrence monétaire récurrente qui affaiblit la monnaie nationale et qui n’est que le reflet d’un éclatement institutionnel. Les bons monétaires, émis par les provinces, ont assuré une fonction partielle de moyens de paiement. D’aucuns ont pu voir dans les monnaies parallèles, la solution pour définir le nouveau régime monétaire. Il faudrait plutôt s’attaquer aux incohérences institutionnelles du fédéralisme argentin, afin d’assurer la viabilité du nouvel ordre monétaire. . Classification JEL : H77, E49, N16, D79

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Colliac, 2005. "Monnaies parallèles provinciales et fédéralisme budgétaire en Argentine," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 81(4), pages 251-269.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2005_num_81_4_4023
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2005.4023
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2005.4023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 157-212, January.
    3. Knapp, Georg Friedrich, 1924. "The State Theory of Money," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number knapp1924.
    4. Mariano Tommasi & Miguel Braun, 2002. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some Organizing Principles and Latin American Experiences," Working Papers 44, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2002.
    5. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is ArgentinaÂ’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 2, pages 169-209, May.
    6. Sebastián M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 169-209, May.
    7. Russell W. Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2001. "Dollarization and the conquest of hyperinflation in divided societies," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 25(Sum), pages 3-12.
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    1. Agustín Elías Casagrande, 2017. "Between History and Passion: The Legitimacy of Social Clubs in the Province of Buenos Aires (2001–2007)," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 5(1), pages 34-41.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • E49 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Other
    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • E49 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Other
    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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