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Le Working Families Tax Credit, un nouveau crédit d'impôt pour les familles de travailleurs à bas revenus au Royaume-Uni

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  • Véronique Delarue

Abstract

[fre] Le Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) est un crédit d’impôt en faveur des familles avec enfants et sous condition d’activité minimale. Il est plus généreux que le Family Credit qu’il remplace depuis octobre 1999. Il devrait concerner environ 1,5 million de foyers, contre 600 000 pour le Family Credit en 1996. Ce versement, sous conditions de ressources et de patrimoine, d’une aide aux familles, dont l’un des membres travaille au moins 16 heures par semaine, devrait permettre que le «travail paie» («Making work pay») et donc stimuler l’offre de travail. Dans ce cadre, le WFTC s’accompagne d’une aide à la garde d’enfants. Grâce à une enveloppe budgétaire plus élevée, les effets redistributifs du WFTC sont plus importants que pour le Family Credit. En revanche, les effets potentiels du WFTC sur la stimulation de l’offre de travail semblent assez limités: à terme, seulement 45 000 personnes pourraient être incitées par le WFTC à entrer sur le marché du travail. L’innovation principale du dispositif réside en fait dans sa gestion: les employeurs «versent» directement le crédit d’impôt au salarié demandeur sous forme de complément de rémunération ou d’une baisse de prélèvement (dans le cadre de l’imposition à la source). La simplicité et l’efficacité du dispositif en sont, sans doute, ainsi améliorées. [spa] El Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) es un crédito de impuesto para familias con hijos y bajo condiciones de actividad minimal. Es más generoso que el Family Credit al que sustituye desde octubre de 1999. Debería afectar a 1,5 millón de hogares, en vez de 600 000 para el Family Credit en 1996. Este pago, bajo condiciones de recursos y de patrimonio, de una ayuda a aquellas familias en las que un miembro trabaja al menos unas 16 horas semanales, debería hacer que el «trabajo pague» ("Making work pay") y así ser un incentivo para la oferta de trabajo. Dentro de este marco, el WFTC es asociado a una ayuda al cuidado de los niños. Gracias a un presupuesto más alto, los efectos redistributivos del WFTC son superiores a los del Family Credit. En cambio, los efectos potenciales del WFTC sobre el incentivo a la oferta de trabajo parecen limitados: a plazo, tan solo unas 45 000 personas podrían entrar en el mercado laboral, bajo el incentivo del WFTC. . La primera innovación del dispositivo estriba en su gestión: los empleadores «pagan» directamente el crédito de impuesto al asalariado que lo solicita, mediante un complemento de remuneración o una baja de la retención (en el caso de una imposición a la fuente). Así aumentan la simplicidad y la eficacia del dispositivo. [eng] The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) is for families with children who work a minimum number of hours. It is more generous than the Family Credit that it replaced in October 1999. It should cover approximately 1.5 million households as opposed to the 600,000 covered by the Family Credit in 1996. This income-and asset-based benefit for families with one member working at least 16 hours per week should accomplish "making work pay" and hence stimulate the labour supply. In this regard, the WFTC is accompanied by childcare assistance. . With its higher budget, the WFTC's redistributive effects are greater than the Family Credit's. However, the WFTC's potential effects on stimulating the labour supply would appear to be somewhat limited. In the long run, only 45,000 people may be encouraged by the WFTC to enter the labour market. . The scheme's major innovation is in its management: employers "pay" the tax credit directly to the applicant employee in the form of additional remuneration or reduced contributions (in the case of the pay-as-you-earn system). This also improves the scheme's simplicity and effectiveness. [ger] Der Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) ist eine Steuervergütung, die Familien mit Kindern und geringfügiger Beschäftigung gewährt wird. Er ist großzügiger als der Family Credit, den er seit Oktober 1999 ersetzt. Davon betroffen dürften rund 1,5 Millionen Haushalte sein, gegenüber 600 000 im Falle des Family Credit im Jahre 1996. Diese einkommens-und vermögensabhängige Zahlung einer Beihilfe für Familien, von denen ein Mitglied mindestens 16 Wochenstunden arbeitet, soll sicherstellen, daß sich "Arbeit auszahlt" ("Making work pay"), und soll somit das Arbeitsangebot stimulieren. Der WFTC geht deshalb auch mit einer Beihilfe für die Kinderbetreuung einher. Da hierfür mehr Haushaltsmittel bereitgestellt werden, sind die Umverteilungseffekte des WFTC größer als beim Family Credit. Dagegen scheinen die potentiellen Auswirkungen des WFTC auf die Stimulierung des Arbeitsangebots recht begrenzt zu sein: langfristig dürfte der WFTC lediglich 45 000 Personen dazu veranlassen, in den Arbeitsmarkt einzutreten. . Die wichtigste Neuerung dieses Systems besteht in seiner Verwaltung: die Arbeitgeber "zahlen" die Steuervergütung direkt an den betroffenen Arbeitnehmer in Form einer zusätzlichen Vergütung oder eine Abgabensenkung (im Falle eines Ouellenabzugs). Dadurch wird dieses System gewiß vereinfacht und effizienter.

Suggested Citation

  • Véronique Delarue, 2000. "Le Working Families Tax Credit, un nouveau crédit d'impôt pour les familles de travailleurs à bas revenus au Royaume-Uni," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 335(1), pages 47-61.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2000_num_335_1_7519
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2000.7519
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2000.7519
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierre Cahuc, 2002. "A quoi sert la prime pour l'emploi ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 3-61.

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