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Insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail et nature du contrat d'embauché : une approche par la théorie des jeux répétés

Listed author(s):
  • Thierry Pénard
  • Michel Sollogoub
  • Valérie Ulrich

[fre] Insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail et nature du contrat d'embauché : une approche par la théorie des jeux répétés par Thierry Pénard, Michel Sollogoub et Valérie Ulrich Cet article évalue les implications comparées de la signature d'un CDD (contrat à durée déterminée) par rapport à celle d'un CDI (contrat à durée indéterminée) sur le marché des travailleurs jeunes faiblement qualifiés. L'utilisation d'un CDD plutôt que d'un CDI présente des avantages pour l'employeur. Nous recherchons, dans un cadre de théorie des jeux répétés, l'impact de la nature du contrat d'embauché (CDD ou CDI) sur les possibilités de coopération entre le salarié et son employeur. Cette coopération s'avère extrêmement sensible aux modalités de rupture du contrat de travail. Ainsi, un employeur dispose avec un CDD d'une menace et peut donc être utilisé comme mécanisme d'incitation à l'effort des salariés. En CDI, cette menace est moins crédible. L'employeur devrait donc être plus enclin à coopérer et devrait verser un salaire plus élevé pour compenser la moindre efficacité des représailles en CDI. Nous testons cette prédiction sur des données issues d'une enquête portant sur des jeunes sortants de l'enseignement secondaire (professionnel ou général) en France. [eng] Integrating Young People into the Labour Market and the Type of Employment Contract: a Repeated Game Theory Approach by Thierry Pénard, Michel Sollogoub and Valérie Ulrich This paper compares the implications of signing a short-term contract as opposed to a long-term contract on the young, low-skilled labour market. Employers reap a number of advantages from opting for a short-term rather than a long-term contract. We use a repeated game theory framework to study the effect of the employment contract type (long-term or short-term) on the possibilities for co-operation between employees and their employers. Co-operation proves to be highly sensitive to the terms of employment contract termination. For example, an employer can use short-term contracts as a threat and hence an incentive to make employees work harder. This threat is less credible in the case of a long-term contract. Employers should therefore be more inclined to co-operate and pay a higher wage to offset the reduced effectiveness of reprisals under a long-term contract. We test this prediction based on data taken f

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 146 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 73-94

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_146_5_6129
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6129
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  1. Burda, Michael C, 1992. " A Note on Firing Costs and Severance Benefits in Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(3), pages 479-489.
  2. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
  3. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Motivation and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June.
  4. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
  5. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
  6. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
  7. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James M., 1993. "Wage premiums and profit maximization in efficiency wage models," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1223-1249, August.
  8. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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