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Entreprise et fiscalité de l'héritage

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  • Henri Lamotte
  • Jean-Philippe Vincent

Abstract

[ger] Unternehmen und Erbschaftssteuer, . von Henri Lamotte, Jean-Philippe Vincent.. . In diesem Artikel werden die wirtschaftlichen Problème infolge der Besteuerung einer Erbschaft analysiert, wenn letztere aus einem nicht börsennotierten Untemehmen besteht, das einen sehr spezifischen Vermögenswert darstellt. Diese Besonderheit, die auf die Art des Unternehmens als Vertragsgefüge, auf das Gewicht des menschlichen Kapitals im Unternehmen und auf die geringe Aufteilbarkeit und den geringen Liquiditätsgrad der Vermögenswerte zurückzuführen ist, findet in den französischen Steuergesetzen nur wenig Berücksichtigung. Aufgrund der wesentlich höheren Steuersätze als im Ausland, der Anwendung von oftmals unangemessenen Bewertungsmethoden und des Fehlens spezieller Bestimmungen zugunsten der Übertragung von Unternehmen, hat die Besteuerung eines nicht börsennotierten Unternehmens bei seiner unentgeltlichen Übertragung hohe wirtschaftliche Kosten zur Folge, wenn sich diese auch nur schwer mit Genauigkeit abschätzen lassen. [spa] Empresa y fîscalidad de la herencia, . por Henri Lamotte y Jean-Philippe Vincent.. . En el presente artícule» se analizan los problemas económicos que engendra la imposición de una herencia cuando ésta incluye una empresa no cotizada que représenta un activo muy específico. La legislación fiscal francesa no toma muy en cuenta esta especificidad, que se debe a la naturaleza de la empresa por ser un vínculo de contratos, al peso del capital humano en la empresa y a la reducida divisibilidad y liquidez de los activos. Debido a un baremo sensiblemente superior al de los demás países, a la aplicación de métodos de evaluación que suelen ser inadaptados y a la ausentia de disposiciones específicas a favor de la transmisión de empresas, la imposición de una empresa no cotizada en el momento de su transmisión a título gratuito genera elevados costes económicos, aunque resuite difícil evaluarlos con precisión. [eng] Firms and Inheritance Taxes, . by Henri Lamotte, Jean-Philippe Vincent.. . This paper provides an analysis of the economic problems which result when taxing an inheritance that includes a firm whose shares are not quoted on the stock market, involving a special type of asset. French fiscal laws have few provisions for dealing with this particular situation, due to the very nature of firms as entities bound by contracts, the level of human capital involved in the firm, and the difficulty involved in dividing capital and converting it into liquid assets. Because the rates are much higher in France than in other countries, because it is difficult to enforce assessment methods which, in many cases are not very well adapted, and because there are no specific provisions governing the transfer of firms, the taxing of a firm which is not quoted on the stock market at the time of transfer free of charge involves considerable economic cost, even though it is difficult to give exact figures for such cost. [fre] Entreprise et fiscalité de l'héritage, . par Henri Lamotte, Jean-Philippe Vincent.. . L'article analyse les problèmes économiques engendrés par la taxation d'un héritage lorsque celui-ci est constitué d'une entreprise non cotée qui représente un actif très spécifique. Cette spécificité, qui tient à la nature de l'entreprise en tant que noeud de contrats, au poids du capital humain dans l'entreprise, et aux faibles divisibilité et liquidité des actifs, est mal prise en compte par la législation fiscale française. Du fait d'un barème sensiblement plus lourd, de l'application de méthodes d'évaluation souvent inadaptées et de l'absence de dispositions spécifiques en faveur de la transmission des entreprises moins favorables qu'à l'étranger, la taxation d'une entreprise non cotée lors de sa transmission à titre gratuit génère des coûts économiques importants même s'ils s'avèrent difficiles à évaluer précisément.

Suggested Citation

  • Henri Lamotte & Jean-Philippe Vincent, 1991. "Entreprise et fiscalité de l'héritage," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 100(4), pages 189-200.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1991_num_100_4_5263
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1991.5263
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1991.5263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    2. Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
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