Entrepreneurship, Sanctions, And Labor Contracting
Entrepreneurs innovate their individual business organizations not only to deal with production and price risks, but also to cope with the risk of sanctions or penalties imposed by society's laws and regulations. More specifically, labor-intensive agricultural firms, faced with potentially large fines for violation of immigration and labor laws, increasingly modify the organization of their firms by shifting the management of routine seasonal labor jobs to independent farm labor contractors. The use of labor contracting is further intensified because of the effectiveness of labor contractors in the recruitment of illegal aliens.
Volume (Year): 23 (1991)
Issue (Month): 01 (July)
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- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier.
- Schultz, Theodore W, 1975. "The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 827-846, September.
- Schultz, Theodore W, 1980. " Investment in Entrepreneurial Ability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(4), pages 437-448.
- Holmes, Thomas J & Schmitz, James A, Jr, 1990.
"A Theory of Entrepreneurship and Its Application to the Study of Business Transfers,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 265-294, April.
- Holmes, T.J. & Schmitz, J.A., 1988. "A Theory Of Enterpreneurship And Its Application To The Study Of Business Transfers," Working papers 8827, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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