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EU Sanctions Policy: Types of Sanctions Measures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council Sanctions
[Sankční politika Evropské unie: typy sankčních opatření a vztah k sankcím Rady bezpečnosti OSN]

Author

Listed:
  • Radka Druláková
  • Jan Martin Rolenc
  • Zuzana Trávníčková
  • Štěpánka Zemanová

Abstract

The autonomous EU sanctions policy became visible at the beginning of the 21st century. Apart from sanctions adopted by the UN SC, the EU actively implements also autonomous measures. The paper focuses on the adoption of sanctions (introduction of restrictive measures), its legal framework, analyses in detail the content of adopted restrictions, and the relationship between the EU and UN sanctions regimes. It reflects on the state of sanctions introduced by the EU before March 8, 2011, and for the particular sanctions regimes, it compares their legal basis, the key content of restrictive measures, the fact whether the EU restrictive measures have a linkage to the UN SC decisions or if they are autonomous measures by EU, as well as whether the sanctions are targeted.

Suggested Citation

  • Radka Druláková & Jan Martin Rolenc & Zuzana Trávníčková & Štěpánka Zemanová, 2011. "EU Sanctions Policy: Types of Sanctions Measures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council Sanctions [Sankční politika Evropské unie: typy sankčních opatření a vztah k sankcím Rady bezpečnosti OSN]," Současná Evropa, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(2), pages 3-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlsev:v:2011:y:2011:i:2:id:19:p:3-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
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