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Work motivation. Self-determination theory: literature review
[Motivace v pracovním prostředí. Teorie sebeurčení a její vývoj: Literární rešerše]

Author

Listed:
  • Kateřina Knorová
  • Jana Fibírová

Abstract

Reward system is a key management tool associated with significant costs and its potential to influence work performance and motivation has been the subject of scientific interest for many years. The self-determination theory (and the preceding cognitive evaluation theory) is one of the relevant theories of work motivation on which research (including managerial accounting research) is based in assessing the impact of rewards on employees' work behavior. This literature review focuses on the development of the self-determination theory, its assumptions, the key conclusions of research studies, and the shift in the perception of rewards from the time the theory was formulated to the present. While early research highlighted the undesirable motivational effects of pay for performance, recent research addresses the contextual factors of the work environment and reward system and analyzes in more detail the effect of pay for performance not only on motivation and performance but also employee retention and satisfaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Kateřina Knorová & Jana Fibírová, 2020. "Work motivation. Self-determination theory: literature review [Motivace v pracovním prostředí. Teorie sebeurčení a její vývoj: Literární rešerše]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2020(3-4), pages 71-93.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2020:y:2020:i:3-4:id:549:p:71-93
    DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.549
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Sara Cabanas & Teresa Proença & Mauro Carozzo-Todaro, 2020. "Pay for Individual Performance: Aiding or Harming Sustainable Intrinsic Motivation?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(16), pages 1-13, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-determination theory; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Pay for performance; Teorie sebeurčení; Intrinsická motivace; Extrinsická motivace; Odměny za výkonnost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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