IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0300873.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Research on the impact of equity incentive model on enterprise performance: A mediating effect analysis based on executive entrepreneurship

Author

Listed:
  • Jinrong Ma
  • Hongbo Wang

Abstract

In implementing the equity incentive system, this paper delves into the listed enterprises’ selection of equity incentive models. While previous research has extensively covered the effects, models, and influencing factors of equity incentives, there needs to be more in-depth literature focusing on the diverse incentive models and their impact on corporate performance. Notably, there needs to be more literature on considering entrepreneurial spirit as a mechanism. It aims to explore the relationship between executives’ choices under different incentive models, the entrepreneurial spirit fostered by these models, and their combined impact on corporate performance. The findings reveal that adopting the restricted stock incentive model by listed enterprises implementing the equity incentive system significantly positively affects enterprise performance. Mechanistic tests show that when a company implements the restricted stock incentive model, executives prioritize maximizing their interests, leading them to embrace more risk in their investment decisions. This behavior, in turn, stimulates the adventurous spirit of executives, positively impacting enterprise performance, particularly pronounced in companies with more concentrated executive power. Moreover, executives may be more inclined to invest in high-risk, high-reward innovative projects, a behavior indicative of innovation and more prevalent in firms with higher research and development (R&D) investment. However, the limitation of this paper is that the study evaluates the operation of the equity incentive system in China by taking listed companies in China as an example, which is not necessarily suitable for foreign developed capitalist countries. This study contributes to the study of principal-agent problems by exploring the relationship between executives, entrepreneurship and firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jinrong Ma & Hongbo Wang, 2024. "Research on the impact of equity incentive model on enterprise performance: A mediating effect analysis based on executive entrepreneurship," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(4), pages 1-25, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0300873
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300873
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0300873
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0300873&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0300873?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ittner, Christopher D. & Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 2003. "The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 89-127, January.
    2. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    3. Ohad Kadan, 2008. "Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(1), pages 451-482, January.
    4. Conyon, Martin J & Murphy, Kevin J, 2000. "The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages 640-671, November.
    5. Danny Miller, 1983. "The Correlates of Entrepreneurship in Three Types of Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(7), pages 770-791, July.
    6. Jinrong Ma & Hongbo Wang & Hasan Dinçer, 2022. "Equity Incentive Model, Source of Subject Matter and Enterprise Performance: Modification Effect Based on Equity Incentive Intensity," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2022, pages 1-13, December.
    7. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
    8. Core, John & Guay, Wayne, 1999. "The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-184, December.
    9. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    10. Jeffrey G. Covin & Dennis P. Slevin, 1989. "Strategic management of small firms in hostile and benign environments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 75-87, January.
    11. Chourou, Lamia & Abaoub, Ezzeddine & Saadi, Samir, 2008. "The economic determinants of CEO stock option compensation," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 61-77, February.
    12. Bei Lyu & Hui Chen, 2022. "Effect of Founder Control on Equity Financing and Corporate Performance-Based on Moderation of Radical Strategy," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Jenny Stewart & Fang Hu, 2018. "Executive stock option vesting conditions, corporate governance and CEO attributes: evidence from Australia," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(2), pages 503-533, June.
    2. Kuo, Chii-Shyan & Li, Ming-Yuan Leon & Yu, Shang-En, 2013. "Non-uniform effects of CEO equity-based compensation on firm performance – An application of a panel threshold regression model," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 203-214.
    3. Tzioumis, Konstantinos, 2008. "Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 100-111, October.
    4. Page, T. Beau, 2018. "CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 378-401.
    5. Timmermans, Oscar, 2024. "Cash versus share payouts in relative performance plans," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123696, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Zhu, Chunhui & Zhang, Teng & Li, Shaoyu, 2021. "Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Hayes, Rachel M. & Lemmon, Michael & Qiu, Mingming, 2012. "Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 174-190.
    8. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    9. Doyoung Kim, 2010. "The use of stock-based pay for sorting: an empirical analysis of compensation for new CEOs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(23), pages 2999-3010.
    10. Ling Xue & Gautam Ray & Xia Zhao, 2017. "Managerial Incentives and IT Strategic Posture," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 180-198, March.
    11. Richardson, Vernon J. & Sanchez, Juan Manuel & Setia, Pankaj & Smith, Rodney, 2018. "Determinants and consequences of chief information officer equity incentives," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 37-57.
    12. Chandra S. Mishra, 2023. "Managerial ability and strategic orientation," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1333-1363, May.
    13. Hyungshin Park & Dimitris Vrettos, 2015. "The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 1055-1108, December.
    14. Merle Erickson & Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, 2006. "Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 113-143, March.
    15. Kuang, Yu Flora & Qin, Bo, 2009. "Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-61.
    16. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sharma, Zenu, 2011. "Leverage and growth: Effect of stock options," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 558-581.
    17. Chen, Jie & Song, Wei & Goergen, Marc, 2019. "Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs' initial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 458-481.
    18. Zhiguo He & Si Li & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2014. "Uncertainty, Risk, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 206-226, January.
    19. Huang, Minjie & Kubick, Thomas R. & Tseng, Kevin, 2021. "Technology spillovers and the duration of executive compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    20. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0300873. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.