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Competition over Personal Resources Favors Contribution to Shared Resources in Human Groups

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  • Jessica L Barker
  • Pat Barclay
  • H Kern Reeve

Abstract

Members of social groups face a trade-off between investing selfish effort for themselves and investing cooperative effort to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance against predators, or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big game. However, group members' personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing effort in taking others' personal resources, and in defending one's own resources against others. We use a game theoretic “tug-of-war” model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We test and find support for these predictions in two laboratory economic games with humans, comparing people's investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-human societies.

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  • Jessica L Barker & Pat Barclay & H Kern Reeve, 2013. "Competition over Personal Resources Favors Contribution to Shared Resources in Human Groups," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(3), pages 1-9, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0058826
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0058826
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    References listed on IDEAS

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