IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pcbi00/1000782.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Inductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Simon DeDeo
  • David C Krakauer
  • Jessica C Flack

Abstract

Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organization. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics in an monkey society model system. We develop a technique, Inductive Game Theory, to extract directly from time-series data the decision-making strategies used by individuals and groups. This technique uses Monte Carlo simulation to test alternative causal models of conflict dynamics. We find individuals base their decision to fight on memory of social factors, not on short timescale ecological resource competition. Furthermore, the social assessments on which these decisions are based are triadic (self in relation to another pair of individuals), not pairwise. We show that this triadic decision making causes long conflict cascades and that there is a high population cost of the large fights associated with these cascades. These results suggest that individual agency has been over-emphasized in the social evolution of complex aggregates, and that pair-wise formalisms are inadequate. An appreciation of the empirical foundations of the collective dynamics of conflict is a crucial step towards its effective management.Author Summary: Persistent conflict is one of the most important contemporary challenges to the integrity of society and to individual quality of life. Yet surprisingly little is understood about conflict. Is resource scarcity and competition the major cause of conflict, or are other factors, such as memory for past conflicts, the drivers of turbulent periods? How do individual behaviors and decision-making rules promote conflict? To date, most studies of conflict use simple, elegant models based on game theory to investigate when it pays to fight. Although these models are powerful, they have limitations: they require that both the strategies used by individuals and the costs and benefits, or payoffs, of these strategies are known, and they are tied only weakly to real-world data. Here we develop a new method, Inductive Game Theory, and apply it to a time series gathered from detailed observation of a primate society. We are able to determine which types of behavior are most likely to generate periods of intense conflict, and we find that fights are not explained by single, aggressive individuals, but by complex interactions among groups of three or higher. Understanding how memory and strategy affect conflict dynamics is a crucial step towards designing better methods for prediction, management and control.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon DeDeo & David C Krakauer & Jessica C Flack, 2010. "Inductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(5), pages 1-16, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1000782
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000782
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000782
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000782&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000782?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miller, John H. & Butts, Carter T. & Rode, David, 2002. "Communication and cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 179-195, February.
    2. Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008. "Winners don’t punish," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
    3. Steven A. Frank, 2009. "Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 3-40, Springer.
    4. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring," Nature, Nature, vol. 393(6685), pages 573-577, June.
    5. Turner, Rolf, 2008. "Direct maximization of the likelihood of a hidden Markov model," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 52(9), pages 4147-4160, May.
    6. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    7. Jessica C. Flack & Michelle Girvan & Frans B. M. de Waal & David C. Krakauer, 2006. "Policing stabilizes construction of social niches in primates," Nature, Nature, vol. 439(7075), pages 426-429, January.
    8. Mike Mesterton-Gibbons & Tom N. Sherratt, 2007. "Coalition formation: a game-theoretic analysis," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 18(2), pages 277-286.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chathika Gunaratne & Ivan Garibay, 2020. "Evolutionary model discovery of causal factors behind the socio-agricultural behavior of the Ancestral Pueblo," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(12), pages 1-18, December.
    2. Elizabeth A Hobson & Simon DeDeo, 2015. "Social Feedback and the Emergence of Rank in Animal Society," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(9), pages 1-20, September.
    3. Soumya Banerjee, 2017. "An Immune System Inspired Theory for Crime and Violence in Cities," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 15(2), pages 133-143.
    4. P. Schimit & B. Santos & C. Soares, 2015. "The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 35-43, January.
    5. Simon DeDeo, 2016. "Conflict and Computation on Wikipedia: A Finite-State Machine Analysis of Editor Interactions," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-23, July.
    6. Eleanor R Brush & David C Krakauer & Jessica C Flack, 2013. "A Family of Algorithms for Computing Consensus about Node State from Network Data," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(7), pages 1-17, July.
    7. Chen, Shi & Bao, Forrest Sheng, 2015. "Linking body size and energetics with predation strategies: A game theoretic modeling framework," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 316(C), pages 81-86.
    8. Huang, Shaoxu & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Fu, Xiao, 2023. "The influence of aggressive behavior on cooperation evolution in social dilemma," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 630(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sheen S. Levine & Michael J. Prietula, 2014. "Open Collaboration for Innovation: Principles and Performance," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(5), pages 1414-1433, October.
    2. Deng, Zhilong & Deming, Mao & Dameng, Dai, 2018. "Asymmetric learning ability promotes cooperation in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 88-91.
    3. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach," MPRA Paper 16923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Terence Burnham, 2015. "Public goods with high-powered punishment: high cooperation and low efficiency," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 173-187, July.
    5. Freya Harrison & James Sciberras & Richard James, 2011. "Strength of Social Tie Predicts Cooperative Investment in a Human Social Network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(3), pages 1-7, March.
    6. Zhang, Shuhua & Zhang, Zhipeng & Wu, Yu’e & Yan, Ming & Li, Yu, 2019. "Strategy preference promotes cooperation in spatial evolutionary games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 514(C), pages 181-188.
    7. Janssen, Marco A., 2008. "Evolution of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma based on recognition of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 458-471, March.
    8. Valerio Capraro, 2013. "A Model of Human Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-6, August.
    9. Wang, Xiaofeng & Chen, Xiaojie & Gao, Jia & Wang, Long, 2013. "Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 181-187.
    10. Wang, Chengjiang & Wang, Li & Wang, Juan & Sun, Shiwen & Xia, Chengyi, 2017. "Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 293(C), pages 18-29.
    11. Frauke von Bieberstein & Andrea Essl & Kathrin Friedrich, 2021. "Empathy: A clue for prosocialty and driver of indirect reciprocity," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(8), pages 1-15, August.
    12. Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2011. "Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 361-375, June.
    13. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    14. Deng, Zhenghong & Wang, Shengnan & Gu, Zhiyang & Xu, Juwei & Song, Qun, 2017. "Heterogeneous preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoners’ dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 20-23.
    15. Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia & Müller, Stephan, 2021. "The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 251-277.
    16. Ben-Ner, Avner & Putterman, Louis & Kong, Fanmin & Magan, Dan, 2004. "Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 333-352, March.
    17. Engelmann, Dirk & Fischbacher, Urs, 2009. "Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 399-407, November.
    18. Andrew W. Bausch, 2014. "Evolving intergroup cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 369-393, December.
    19. Suzuki, Shinsuke & Akiyama, Eizo, 2008. "Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 426-436.
    20. Molina, José Alberto & Ferrer, Alfredo & Gimenez-Nadal, José Ignacio & Gracia-Lazaro, Carlos & Moreno, Yamir & Sanchez, Angel, 2016. "The Effect of Kinship on Intergenerational Cooperation: A Lab Experiment with Three Generations," IZA Discussion Papers 9842, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1000782. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ploscompbiol (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.