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The Entrepreneur's Choice: Venture Capital Debt Financing with Adverse Selection

Author

Listed:
  • G. Geoffrey Booth

    (Michigan State University)

  • Orkunt M. Dalgic

    (State University of New York at New Paltz)

  • Allan Young

    (Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia & Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University)

Abstract

This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the quality of the venture capitalist, but also the problem of a reduced ownership value of future rents from the venture if the venture capitalist takes it over as the result of default of the entrepreneur. Expressions for the face value of debt required for pooling and separating equilibria are also derived. The existence of a separating equilibrium with bad quality venture capitalists is used to show how less reputable venture capitalists can survive in the marketplace. Finally, the paper uses a numerical example to demonstrate why the entrepreneurs of more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to do business with bad quality venture capitalists.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Geoffrey Booth & Orkunt M. Dalgic & Allan Young, 2004. "The Entrepreneur's Choice: Venture Capital Debt Financing with Adverse Selection," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 9(3), pages 15-28, Fall.
  • Handle: RePEc:pep:journl:v:9:y:2004:i:3:p:15-28
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    2. Catherine Casamatta, 2003. "Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2059-2086, October.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August.
    4. Trester, Jeffrey J., 1998. "Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 675-699, August.
    5. Gompers, Paul A., 1998. "Venture capital growing pains: Should the market diet?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 1089-1104, August.
    6. Gompers, Paul A., 1996. "Grandstanding in the venture capital industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 133-156, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Venture Capital; Debt; Adverse Selection;

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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