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A Causality Analysis Of Public Participation, Government Regulation And Environment Pollutions Using Regional Panel Data

Author

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  • WEN-BIN PENG

    (Faculty of Business School, Hunan University of Science and Technology, China)

  • KUN TIAN

    (Faculty of Business School, Xiangtan University, China)

  • YIN-HUA TIAN

    (Faculty of Business School, Hunan University of Science and Technology, China)

  • GUO-CHENG XIANG

    (Faculty of Business School, Hunan University of Science and Technology, China)

Abstract

Utilizing the regional data of China covering 29 provinces and municipalities during 1990-2009, this article outlines a systematic approach to investigate the relations between public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions. Results show that government regulation influences environment pollutions while environment pollutions have no influence on government regulation in the short term. Besides, environment pollutions and public participation have no influence on each other. In the long term, there exists the Granger causality among public participation, government regulation and environment pollutions. Our results also show that improving the public participation’s ability in environmental protection and strengthening government regulation’s intensity are the basic measures to improve China's environmental pollution in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Wen-Bin Peng & Kun Tian & Yin-Hua Tian & Guo-Cheng Xiang, 2011. "A Causality Analysis Of Public Participation, Government Regulation And Environment Pollutions Using Regional Panel Data," Perspectives of Innovation in Economics and Business (PIEB), Prague Development Center, vol. 8(2), pages 53-56, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdc:jrpieb:v:8:y:2011:i:2:p:53-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1996. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal Regulator," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 233-253, March.
    2. Dasgupta, Susmita & Laplante, Benoit & Mamingi, Nlandu & Wang, Hua, 2001. "Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 487-498, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public participation; government regulation; environment pollutions; panel causality analysis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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