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Reasons For Conglomeration: Empirical Analysis Of Management Responses In Chile

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  • JORGE TARZIJÁN M

    () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

  • JOSÉ RIVERA

    () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

This paper is intended to contribute to the understanding of the motivations behind the diversification decisions of the Chilean “economic groups”. With this objective we surveyed the largest such groups in Chile. Our results show that the most important reasons for diversification for the top management of the Chilean business groups are managerial synergies (board of directors), financial synergies, information synergies and some specific operational synergies such as economies of scope in research and development. Also, most of the respondents stated that the diversification decisions of their firms or business groups have increased the multimarket contact with other companies or groups, influencing the strategies and diversification of competitors. The relationship between the degree of diversification of a group and its stated reasons for diversification are also analyzed. Significant differences in the motivations for diversification exist, depending on the group's actual level of diversification. Specifically, variables such as multimarket contact and access to the capital market are more important in more diversified groups. We also analyze the relationship between the size of a group and its stated reasons for diversification. There appear to be no significant differences between the answers of the management of bigger and smaller conglomerates. However, there is a positive correlation between the size of the groups and their level of diversification.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Tarziján M & José Rivera, 2000. "Reasons For Conglomeration: Empirical Analysis Of Management Responses In Chile," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 3(2), pages 203-226.
  • Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:203-226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conglomerates; Corporate Structures; Emerging Markets; Diversification Decisions; Chile;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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