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Risk Equalisation in Ireland and Australia: A Simulation Analysis to Compare Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • John Armstrong

    (Institute of Public Administration)

  • Francesco Paolucci

    (Australian Centre for Economic Research on Health, Australian National University)

Abstract

Risk equalisation has been implemented in a number of countries as a means of providing explicit risk-adjusted transfers between health insurance undertakings to improve efficiency within the health insurance market, and make health insurance affordable. Two such countries are Australia and Ireland. In this article, a simulation exercise is carried out to compare the effectiveness of the two countries’ risk equalisation schemes in meeting the policy objectives of encouraging insurers to be efficient and discouraging them from engaging in risk selection. The results of the analysis show that the Australian scheme is less effective than the Irish scheme in reducing the incentive for risk selection and in encouraging insurers to be efficient. The results provide evidence that direct standardisation mechanisms (as used in Ireland) can lead to superior outcomes as compared to indirect standardisation mechanisms (as used in Australia) in terms of promoting efficiency and deterring risk selection.

Suggested Citation

  • John Armstrong & Francesco Paolucci, 2010. "Risk Equalisation in Ireland and Australia: A Simulation Analysis to Compare Outcomes," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(4), pages 521-538, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:35:y:2010:i:4:d:10.1057_gpp.2010.23
    DOI: 10.1057/gpp.2010.23
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Beck, Konstantin & Van de Voorde, Carine & Wasem, Jurgen & Zmora, Irit, 2007. "Risk adjustment and risk selection in Europe: 6 years later," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(2-3), pages 162-179, October.
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    4. Connelly, Luke B. & Paolucci, Francesco & Butler, James R.G. & Collins, Paul, 2010. "Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance markets: The case of Australia," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 3-14, November.
    5. Armstrong, John, 2010. "Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance markets: The case of Ireland," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 15-26, November.
    6. van Barneveld, Erik M. & Lamers, Leida M. & van Vliet, Rene C. J. A. & van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M., 2001. "Risk sharing as a supplement to imperfect capitation: a tradeoff between selection and efficiency," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 147-168, March.
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    8. Armstrong, John & Paolucci, Francesco & McLeod, Heather & van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M., 2010. "Risk equalisation in voluntary health insurance markets: A three country comparison," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 39-49, November.
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