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Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management

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  • C. Wei Li
  • Ashish Tiwari

Abstract

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type "bonus" incentive fee. We show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Wei Li & Ashish Tiwari, 2009. "Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(11), pages 4681-4714, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:22:y:2009:i:11:p:4681-4714
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:pal:assmgt:v:19:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1057_s41260-017-0061-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Markus Ibert & Ron Kaniel & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Roine Vestman, 2017. "Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?," NBER Working Papers 23373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Wang, Jian & Sheng, Jiliang & Yang, Jun, 2013. "Optimism bias and incentive contracts in portfolio delegation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 493-499.
    4. Assaf Hamdani & Eugene Kandel & Yevgeny Mugerman & Yishay Yafeh, 2016. "Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment," NBER Working Papers 22634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2012. "Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1679-1685.
    6. Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2014. "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," NBER Working Papers 20480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Agarwal, Vikas & Gómez, Juan-Pedro & Priestley, Richard, 2012. "Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1600-1625.
    8. Cuoco, Domenico & Kaniel, Ron, 2011. "Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 264-296, August.
    9. Jeremy Burke & Angela Hung & Jack Clift & Steven Garber & Joanne K. Yoong, 2015. "Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry," Working Papers WR-1076, RAND Corporation.
    10. Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Jian & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2014. "Asymmetric contracts, cash flows and risk taking of mutual funds," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 435-442.
    11. Hamdani, Assaf & Kandel, Eugene & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Yafeh, Yishay, 2015. "Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment in Israel," CEPR Discussion Papers 10911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. repec:eee:jbfina:v:89:y:2018:i:c:p:105-124 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:3:p:567-587 is not listed on IDEAS

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