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Strong-Form Efficiency with Monopolistic Insiders

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Listed:
  • Minh Chau
  • Dimitri Vayanos

Abstract

We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with competitive market makers and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in prices only after a long series of dividend observations. Thus, the insider's information is 'long-lived.' Surprisingly, however, the monopolistic insider chooses to reveal her information very quickly, within a time converging to zero as the market approaches continuous trading. Although the market converges to strong-form efficiency, the insider's profits do not converge to zero. , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Minh Chau & Dimitri Vayanos, 2008. "Strong-Form Efficiency with Monopolistic Insiders," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 2275-2306, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2008:i:5:p:2275-2306
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhl029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Merton, Robert C., 1971. "Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 373-413, December.
    2. Dimitri Vayanos, 2001. "Strategic Trading in a Dynamic Noisy Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 131-171, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dan Bernhardt & P. Seiler & B. Taub, 2010. "Speculative dynamics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 1-52, July.
    2. Ou-Yang, Hui & Wu, Weili, 2017. "Net trade and market efficiency in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 75-85.
    3. Roşu, Ioanid, 2019. "Fast and slow informed trading," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-30.
    4. Roberto Monte & Barbara Trivellato, 2009. "An equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 32(2), pages 83-128, November.
    5. FOUCAULT, Thierry & DUGAST, Jérôme, 2014. "False News, Informational Efficiency, and Price Reversals," HEC Research Papers Series 1036, HEC Paris.
    6. Wang, Kun Tracy & Wang, Wanbin Walter, 2017. "Competition in the stock market with asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 40-49.
    7. Gong, Fuzhou & Liu, Hong, 2012. "Inside trading, public disclosure and imperfect competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 200-223.
    8. Banerjee, Snehal & Breon-Drish, Bradyn, 2020. "Strategic trading and unobservable information acquisition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 458-482.
    9. Sadzik, Tomasz & Woolnough, Chris, 2021. "Snowballing private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    10. Hsu, Chih-Hsiang, 2016. "Strategic noise trading of later-informed traders in a multi-market framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 235-243.
    11. Guo, Mng, 2023. "Dampening effect and market efficiency," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    12. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
    13. Vitale, Paolo, 2018. "Robust trading for ambiguity-averse insiders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 113-130.
    14. Breckenfelder, Johannes, 2013. "Competition between high-frequency traders, and market quality," MPRA Paper 66715, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2013.
    15. Kakhbod, Ali & Song, Fei, 2020. "Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 203-232.
    16. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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