Urban interactions and spatial structure
This article specifies and solves a model of endogenous spatial interactions where agents choose to visit a particular location to interact with others. Equilibrium fails to achieve first-best levels of visits and population density. A construction subsidy can restore second-best efficiency, but not first-best because it does not operate on the visit margin directly. A transportation subsidy can achieve first best. This result--which contrasts with earlier work--comes from treating interaction as a choice variable, rather than focusing on population density, a correlate. Developers are unable to implement even second-best efficiency because of their limited control over a city's land area. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jecgeo:v:7:y:2007:i:2:p:119-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.