Currency crisis and collapse in interwar Greece: predicament or policy failure?
In 1928 Greece viewed the anchoring to the Gold Exchange Standard as the imperative choice in order to implant financial credibility and attract foreign capital. After the British pound exited the system in 1931, Greece chose a defence that exhausted foreign reserves and finally quitted in 1932. The Drachma devalued and debt payments were repudiated. Instead of a fast recovery, unemployment rose and the country entered a period of instability that ended with the imposition of dictatorship in 1936. The lessons are perhaps relevant for the costs that Greece would likely face by exiting the Eurozone. Copyright , Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Aleh Tsyvinski & Arijit Mukherji & Christian Hellwig, 2006.
"Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1769-1787, December.
- Christian Hellwig & Arijit Mukherji & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 11191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1987. "Collapsing exchange rate regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 71-83, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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