An Introduction To Behavioral Corporate Finance
The purpose of this paper is to reflect the behavioral aspects that govern corporations. The paper briefly presents some of the main pillars of behavioral corporate finance: management, closed – end funds puzzle, dividends and the importance of aggregate earnings releases. The first pillar consists in a brief presentation of the behavioral factors related to the management of corporations, such as the fact that independent directors are not that independent as they should be, they do not have the prerequisite expertise for assessing complex financial risks, the importance of ethics and having a corporate culture that nurtures doing the right thing above anything else and the fact that CEO’s decisions reflect in good part, their personal style rather than a set of criteria determined by the company. In the second part of the paper, it is treated the puzzle why would investors buy a closed-end fund at its IPO price, knowing that it is likely to fall to a discount, when they could buy instead an open-end fund that is guaranteed always to trade at par and some mentions about the way that dividend policy may be influenced by managers “catering” to the demands of investors and also the effects of aggregate earnings announcements over the market returns.
Volume (Year): 1 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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- Randall Morck, 2004. "Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance - Independent Directors, Non-Executive Chairs, and the Importance of the Devil's Advocate," NBER Working Papers 10644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2289-2325, October.
- Hirshleifer, David & Lim, Sonya Seongyeon & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2006. "Driven to distraction: Extraneous events and underreaction to earnings news," MPRA Paper 3110, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2007.
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"Market Timing and Capital Structure,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm181, Yale School of Management.
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9222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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