IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nea/journl/y2012i13p160-163.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

To Restore Dialogue with Business and to Create Proper Incentives for Public Officials

Author

Listed:
  • Yakovlev, A.

    (The Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yakovlev, A., 2012. "To Restore Dialogue with Business and to Create Proper Incentives for Public Officials," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 160-163.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:13:p:160-163
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2012-13-160-163r.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    2. Boris Kuznetsov & Tatiana Dolgopyatova & Vladimir Gimpelson & Victoria Golikova & Ksenia R. Gonchar & Andrei Yakovlev & Yevgeny G. Yasin, 2010. "Russian Manufacturing Revisited: Industrial Enterprises at the Start of the Crisis," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 111, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    3. Yakovlev, A. & Govorun, A., 2011. "Business Associations as a Business-Government Liaison: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 98-127.
    4. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Zekun & Jiang, Caixin & Huang, Jun & Zhang, Weiwen & Li, Xuewen, 2023. "Fiscal incentive, political incentive, and strategic interaction of illegal land use by local governments," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2019. "Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 63-94.
    3. Cao, Chunfang & Li, Xiaoyang & Xia, Changyuan, 2021. "The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Mitchell, Austin M. & Yin, Weiwen, 2022. "Political centralization, career incentives, and local economic growth in Edo Japan," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Bai, Chong-En & Liu, Qing & Yao, Wen, 2020. "Earnings inequality and China's preferential lending policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    6. Chen, Zhiyuan & Li, Yong & Zhang, Jie, 2016. "The bank–firm relationship: Helping or grabbing?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 385-403.
    7. Chen, Ye & Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 421-425, September.
    8. Tang, Peng & Feng, Yue & Li, Min & Zhang, Yanyan, 2021. "Can the performance evaluation change from central government suppress illegal land use in local governments? A new interpretation of Chinese decentralisation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    9. Ling, Leng & Luo, Danglun & SHE, Guoman, 2019. "Judging a book by its Cover: The influence of physical attractiveness on the promotion of regional leaders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 1-14.
    10. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
    11. Yaobo Shi & Chun-Ping Chang & Chyi-Lu Jang & Yu Hao, 2018. "Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1873-1891, July.
    12. Zhang, Muyang & Zhou, Guangsu & Fan, Gang, 2020. "Political Control and Economic Inequality: Evidence from Chinese Cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    13. Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022. "Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 30780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Jiajing Sun & Michael Cole & Zhiyuan Huang & Shouyang Wang, 2019. "Chinese leadership: Provincial perspectives on promotion and performance," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 37(4), pages 750-772, June.
    15. Mengheng Liu & Xingwang Qian, 2021. "Provincial Interdependence and China’s “Irrational” Outward Foreign Direct Investment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 153-181, February.
    16. Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "State Capacity and Leadership: Why Did China Take off?," Chinese Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 50-68, January.
    17. Chen, Jing & Liu, Shenglong & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2025. "Resources coupled with executive authority: Implications of relocating government administrative headquarters for local economic development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    18. Qichun He & Meng Sun, 2018. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate? Evidence from Chinese Panel Data," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 75-101, May.
    19. Wang, Jiayi & Lei, Ping, 2021. "The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    20. Tan, Jing & Liu, Tianyi & Xu, Hao, 2024. "The environmental and economic consequences of environmental centralization: Evidence from China's environmental vertical management reform," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:13:p:160-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Tcharykov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.