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Influence of board interlocking in the selection of the audit firm on the mandatory caster

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Listed:
  • Evandro de Nez

    (Universidade Regional de Blumenau, Brazil)

  • Paulo Roberto da Cunha

    (Universidade Regional de Blumenau, Brazil)

Abstract

In the board of directors is common to observe the interaction between companies from inserting the same counselor in different councils, which is called the Board Interlocking (BI), disseminating information and experience among advisers who seek to use them for decision making. The aim of the study is to assess the influence of Board Interlocking in audit firm selection in mandatory rotation in companies listed on the BM&FBovespa. This is a study, documentary and quantitative. We used a sample of 235 companies that had the exchange of the audit firm in 2012. The processing and analysis of data using descriptive statistics and logistic regression. The results indicate the existence of BI in the enterprises. The result of the regression indicates an improvement in the model assertiveness, but without statistical significance. It was concluded that the BI is practiced by Brazilian companies and does not influence the choice of audit firm on mandatory rotation.

Suggested Citation

  • Evandro de Nez & Paulo Roberto da Cunha, 2018. "Influence of board interlocking in the selection of the audit firm on the mandatory caster," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 63(2), pages 5-6, Junio.
    • Handle: RePEc:nax:conyad:v:63:y:2018:i:2:p:5-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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