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Does Board Supervisory Quality Enhance Corporate Social Performance?-Evidence from Taiwanese Listed Firms

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  • Yaying Mary Chou Yeh
  • Wen-Chi Hsieh

Abstract

This study uses Taiwanese public firms as a sample to examine if board supervisory quality enhances CSP. The present study uses four proxies for supervisory quality of board at group level- board meeting attendance rate, number of board meetings, social capital of the board and average training hours of directors. We obtain 348 CSR data from an international CSR rating agent and match them with double size non-CSR firms. We find that CSR firms exhibit significantly higher board attendance rate, board meeting frequency and board social capital than non-CSR firms. For CSR firms, board attendance rate and board meeting frequency positively impact CSR ratings, implying that board diligence is essential to monitoring management to achieve higher social objectives. However, board social capital and training significantly but negatively impact CSP, implying busy board and inexperienced board detriments CSP.Board success in CSR means directors must be passionate about the issues on CSR. Additionally, firms that are behind social agenda need to recruit resourceful directors to diversify information base for advises about stakeholder issues and trends. Firms that have taken steps in CSR activities should not recruit overly busy directors or inexperienced directors. Our paper provides both theoretical and practical implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaying Mary Chou Yeh & Wen-Chi Hsieh, 2017. "Does Board Supervisory Quality Enhance Corporate Social Performance?-Evidence from Taiwanese Listed Firms," Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(1), pages 6889-6889, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mth:ajfa88:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:6889
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1111, June.
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    3. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Singh, Manohar & Lee, Chun I., 2009. "Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 819-828, May.
    4. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    5. Po-Keung Ip, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Crony Capitalism in Taiwan," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 167-177, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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