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The Neoinstitutional Contracts Theory: New Perspectives

  • Oleg Sukharev
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    A new version of the contracts theory in terms of economic agent's interaction analysis, their competition, ideas about unfavorable selection, legal efficiency/inefficiency, institutions dysfunction is elaborated in the article. The author evaluates efficiency criteria and offers his own model of effective contracting, considers conditions and restrictions of contract interactions of agents subject to the model of agents' behaviour in a view to legal efficiency and opportunism. The critical estimation of O. Williamson's contracts theory is given and the author's classification of contracts and the basis of the contract theory corresponding to the changed format of modern contracting on a microeconomic level are suggested.

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    Article provided by Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT) in its journal Montenegrin Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 87-118

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    Handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:87-118
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.mnje.com

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    1. Ruff, Larry E., 1969. "Research and technological progress in a cournot economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 397-415, December.
    2. Coase Ronald, 1991. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 10, December.
    3. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
    4. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
    5. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
    6. Datta, Samar K. & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 1986. "Adversary activities and per capita income growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(12), pages 1457-1461, December.
    7. Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521269339 is not listed on IDEAS
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