The Neoinstitutional Contracts Theory: New Perspectives
A new version of the contracts theory in terms of economic agent's interaction analysis, their competition, ideas about unfavorable selection, legal efficiency/inefficiency, institutions dysfunction is elaborated in the article. The author evaluates efficiency criteria and offers his own model of effective contracting, considers conditions and restrictions of contract interactions of agents subject to the model of agents' behaviour in a view to legal efficiency and opportunism. The critical estimation of O. Williamson's contracts theory is given and the author's classification of contracts and the basis of the contract theory corresponding to the changed format of modern contracting on a microeconomic level are suggested.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Coase, R H, 1992.
"The Institutional Structure of Production,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 713-19, September.
- Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
- Datta, Samar K. & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 1986. "Adversary activities and per capita income growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(12), pages 1457-1461, December.
- Ruff, Larry E., 1969. "Research and technological progress in a cournot economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 397-415, December.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
- Akerlof,George A., 1984. "An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521269339, November.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
- Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:87-118. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eryk Wdowiak)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.