Reforming the Pay-As-You-Go Pension System: Who Votes for it? When?
We assess the political support for parametric reforms of the pay-as-you-go pension system following a drop in the fertility rate. Using a continuous-time overlapping-generations model, we argue that reforms that consist in cutting pension benefits or increasing the retirement age are likely to receive strong political support. An increase in the contribution rate has, on the contrary, fewer chances to be approved by the majority of the voters. This framework also allows us to identify the costs and benefits of postponing each type of reform and to determine how the timing of the different reforms affects their political support.
Volume (Year): 67 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/fa|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michele BOLDRIN & Mariacristina DE NARDI & Larry E. JONES, 2015.
"Fertility and Social Security,"
JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 261-299, September.
- Michele Boldrin & Maria Cristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005. "Fertility and Social Security," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michele Boldrin & Mariacristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005. "Fertility and Social Security," NBER Working Papers 11146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michele Boldrin & Mariacristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005. "Fertility and Social Security," Staff Report 359, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. " The Political Economy of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 503-522, June.
- CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, "undated". "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 259, CESifo Group Munich.
- CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1999. "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers 1999055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
- Juan C. Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 1999. "Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 757-795, October.
- Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201109)67:3_225:rtppsw_2.0.tx_2-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.