The Revenue Consequences of Using a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base to Determine Taxable Income in the EU Member States
This paper provides an assessment of the revenue consequences that would result from implementation of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). We find that the total tax revenue of the EU member states is reduced by 4.56% under a compulsory CCCTB and by 4.65% under an optional CCCTB. The revenue effect for the individual member states is particularly dependent on the nominal tax rate. According to our findings, the Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia would profit from a compulsory CCCTB, whereas Ireland and the Netherlands would stand to suffer the greatest losses.
Volume (Year): 67 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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