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Tax Interdependence in the U.S. States

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Abstract

State governments finance their expenditures with multiple tax instruments, so when collec-tions from one source decline, they are typically compensated by greater revenues from other sources. This paper addresses the important question of the extent to which personal and cor-porate income taxes are used to compensate for sales tax ‡uctuations within the U.S. states. The results show that one percent increase in the sales tax rate is associated with a half and a third percent decrease in the personal and corporate income tax rates respectively. In terms of tax revenues per capita, the results show that a one percent increase in the sales tax revenue per capita is associated with a 3 percent and a 0.9 percent decrease in the corporate and personal income tax revenue per capita respectively. On average then, an exogenous reduction of $4.5 in the sales tax revenue per capita is compensated, ceteris paribus, with an increase of either $3.4 in the collections per capita from corporate taxes or $3.6 in the ones from personal income taxes.

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  • Claudio Agostini, "undated". "Tax Interdependence in the U.S. States," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv151, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv151
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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