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On the Economics of Contribution Evasion

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Baumann
  • Tim Friehe
  • Marcus Jansen

Abstract

This paper considers the tax evasion decision when taxes constitute contributions to the financing of social insurance programs, such as un employment insurance. We call this evasion contribution evasion and establish that critical differences exist between contribution evasion and tax evasion, the central difference being that contributions entitle the contributor to future claims. Furthermore, we derive a recomme ndation for the reduction of contribution evasion, referring to the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean social security systems .

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Marcus Jansen, 2009. "On the Economics of Contribution Evasion," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(2), pages 162-177, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200906)65:2_162:oteoce_2.0.tx_2-y
    DOI: 10.1628/001522109X466509
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1990. "Tax Structure and Tax Compliance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(4), pages 603-613, November.
    2. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Marcus Jansen, 2009. "On the Economics of Contribution Evasion," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(2), pages 162-177, June.
    3. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    4. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N., 1993. "Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, October.
    5. Bailey, Clive & Turner, John, 2001. "Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in Social Security Financing," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 385-393, February.
    6. Alm, James, 1988. "Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 237-245, March.
    7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simonovits, András, 2010. "Adómorál és adórendszer
      [Tax morality and progressive wage tax]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 481-496.
    2. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Marcus Jansen, 2009. "On the Economics of Contribution Evasion," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(2), pages 162-177, June.
    3. -, 2016. "Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2016: Public finances and the challenge of reconciling austerity with growth and equality," Libros y Documentos Institucionales, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 40090 edited by Eclac, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    evasion; social security; unemployment insurance; contributions;

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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