IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mes/challe/v53y2010i3p49-65.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Politics of Paying Interest on Bank Reserves

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Palley

Abstract

The Federal Reserve has recently activated its newly acquired powers to pay interest on reserves of depository institutions. The Fed maintains that its new policy increases economic efficiency and intends it to play a lead role in the exit from quantitative easing. This paper argues it is a bad policy that has a deflationary bias; is costly to taxpayers, and that cost will increase as normal conditions return; and establishes institutional lock-in that obstructs desirable changes to regulatory policy. The paper recommends repealing the Fed's power to pay interest on bank reserves. Second, the Fed should repeal regulation Q, which prohibits payment of interest on demand deposits. Third, the Fed should immediately implement an alternative system of asset-based reserve requirements (liquidity ratios) that will improve monetary control and can help exit quantitative easing at no cost to the public purse. Now is the optimal time for this change.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Palley, 2010. "The Politics of Paying Interest on Bank Reserves," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(3), pages 49-65.
  • Handle: RePEc:mes:challe:v:53:y:2010:i:3:p:49-65
    DOI: 10.2753/0577-5132530303
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2753/0577-5132530303
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, September.
    2. Thomas Mayer, 1966. "Interest Payments On Required Reserve Balances," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 116-118, March.
    3. Thomas Palley, 2003. "Asset Price Bubbles and the Case for Asset-Based Reserve Requirements," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(3), pages 53-72.
    4. Todd Keister & Antoine Martin & James J. McAndrews, 2008. "Divorcing money from monetary policy," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 41-56.
    5. Thomas Palley, 2004. "Asset-based reserve requirements: reasserting domestic monetary control in an era of financial innovation and instability," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 43-58.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mes:challe:v:53:y:2010:i:3:p:49-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/MCHA20 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.