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Redistributional Consequences of Decentralizing the Tax-Transfer Scheme

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  • Lohse Tim

    (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin)

Abstract

Ausgehend von dem Umstand, dass Umverteilung in einem Föderalstaat zwei Dimensionen hat - zum einen die Einkommensumverteilung zwischen reicheren und ärmeren Bevölkerungsteilen und zum anderen die Umverteilung von reicheren zu ärmeren Regionen - analysiert der Aufsatz die Fragen, wie Steuern und Transfers ausgestaltet sein sollten und welche staatliche Ebene überhaupt die steuerliche Gesetzgebungskompetenz haben muss, damit diese beiden Arten der Umverteilung in wohlfahrtsmaximierender Weise verwirklicht werden können. Mittels eines Modells mit zwei Regionen und einer die Föderation regierenden Zentralregierung werden hierzu verschiedene Szenarien der Zentralisierung bzw. Dezentralisierung des Steuer- Transfer-Systems im Hinblick auf ihre regionalen und föderalen Umverteilungswirkungen miteinander verglichen. Die Analyse belegt, dass regionsspezifische Steuer- Transfer-Systeme in Verbindung mit einer pauschalen Umverteilung von der reichen zur armen Region optimal sind. Dabei kann es sogar durchaus gesamtwirtschaftlich sinnvoll sein, so stark zwischen den beiden Regionen umzuverteilen, dass sich das Verhältnis von armer und reicher Region umkehrt.

Suggested Citation

  • Lohse Tim, 2009. "Redistributional Consequences of Decentralizing the Tax-Transfer Scheme," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 168-180, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:reveco:v:60:y:2009:i:2:p:168-180
    DOI: 10.1515/roe-2009-0204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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