The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges
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References listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
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- Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
- Maria Montero, 2010.
"Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox,"
2010-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Maria Montero, 2010. "Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox," Discussion Papers 2010-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Francis X. Flanagan, 2015. "Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 385-416.
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KeywordsBackwards induction; Candidate types; Donation paradox; Jury; Power; Sequential decision;
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