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Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox

In: Advances in Collective Decision Making

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Montero

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantageous in many collective decision-making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper, I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Montero, 2023. "Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer (ed.), Advances in Collective Decision Making, pages 159-171, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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