IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v15y1999i1p41-63.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Alberini, Anna
  • Austin, David

Abstract

We test a model of states' adoption of the hazardous waste liability regime (negligence, strict liability) providing greater net benefits. The likelihood of adopting strict liability increases in a state's number of chemical-intensive manufacturing plants, decreases in the number of large mining establishments. Also predictive: severity of state's hazardous waste problem, effectiveness of other state environmental programs, and political climate. States may view strict liability as better for industrial than mining pollution, and may be partly motivated by "precaution targeting" and "deep pockets" mentality. Non-adopters may wish not to discourage business or have other programs that substitute for strict liability. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Alberini, Anna & Austin, David, 1999. "On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 41-63, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:41-63
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard K. Harper & Stephen C. Adams, 1996. "Cercla And Deep Pockets: Market Response To The Superfund Program," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(1), pages 107-115, January.
    2. Shreekant Gupta & George Van Houtven & Maureen Cropper, 1996. "Paying for Permanence: An Economic Analysis of EPA's Cleanup Decisions at Superfund Sites," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 563-582, Autumn.
    3. Viscusi, W. Kip, 1996. "Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102932.
    4. Tom H. Tietenberg, 1989. "Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(4), pages 305-319.
    5. Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-197, February.
    6. Ringleb, Al H & Wiggins, Steven N, 1990. "Liability and Large-Scale, Long-term Hazards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 574-595, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. van 't Veld, Klaas, 2006. "Hazardous-industry restructuring to avoid liability for accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 297-322, September.
    2. Vera Angelova & Olivier Armantier & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart, 2014. "Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 531-556, December.
    3. Pierre Bentata, 2014. "Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 201-228, July.
    4. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
    5. Turaga, Rama Mohana R. & Noonan, Douglas & Bostrom, Ann, 2011. "Hot spots regulation and environmental justice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(7), pages 1395-1405, May.
    6. Anna Alberini & David Austin, 2002. "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(4), pages 729-741, November.
    7. Hilary Sigman, 2010. "Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial Land," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 289-306, May.
    8. van 't Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Environmental federalism and environmental liability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 105-119.
    9. Alberini, Anna & Austin, David H., 1999. "Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 20-48, July.
    10. Amy Ando & Wallapak Polasub, 2009. "The political economy of state-level adoption of natural resource damage programs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 312-330, June.
    11. Di Maria, Corrado & Smulders, Sjak & van der Werf, Edwin, 2012. "Absolute abundance and relative scarcity: Environmental policy with implementation lags," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 104-119.
    12. Jonathan Yoder, 2008. "Liability, Regulation, and Endogenous Risk: The Incidence and Severity of Escaped Prescribed Fires in the United States," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 297-325, May.
    13. Anna Alberini & Shelby Frost, 2007. "Forcing Firms to Think About the Future: Economic Incentives and the Fate of Hazardous Waste," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(4), pages 451-474, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L68 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:41-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.