IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v12y1997i3p227-43.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Choosing among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Donald, Stephen G
  • Sappington, David E M

Abstract

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state governments, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically, and (3) as the firm's earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Donald, Stephen G & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Choosing among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 227-243, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:3:p:227-43
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. I. Vogelsang, 2015. "Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(2), pages 117-155, June.
    2. Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2011. "Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 107-117, March.
    3. Andrade, Tiago, 2014. "The impact of regulation, privatization and competition on gas infrastructure investments," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 82-85.
    4. Guerriero, Carmine, 2013. "The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
    5. Kevin Currier, 2004. "Natural monopoly regulation in the presence of cost misreporting," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(1), pages 49-61, March.
    6. Tomaso Duso & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2001. "Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    7. Duso, Tomaso & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003. "Endogenous deregulation: evidence from OECD countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 67-71, October.
    8. Jaison Abel & Michael Clements, 2001. "Entry under Asymmetric Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(2), pages 227-242, September.
    9. Wang, Hongwei & Wu, Wenqing & Zheng, Shilin, 2011. "An econometric analysis of private sector participation in China’s urban water supply," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 134-141.
    10. Michael Schmidthaler & Jed Cohen & Johannes Reichl & Stefan Schmidinger, 2015. "The effects of network regulation on electricity supply security: a European analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 285-316, December.
    11. Anna Ter-Martirosyan & John Kwoka, 2010. "Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distribution," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 258-273, December.
    12. James Prieger, 2008. "Product innovation, signaling, and endogenous regulatory delay," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 95-118, October.
    13. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2011. "Incentives for cost shifting and misreporting: US rural universal service subsidies, 1991–2002," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 287-295.
    14. James E. Prieger, 2003. "The Timing of Product Innovation and Regulatory Delay," Working Papers 19, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    15. Weisman, Dennis L., 2002. "Is there 'Hope' for price cap regulation?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 349-370, September.
    16. Ricardo Paredes, 2002. "A further step to deregulation, or the risk to destroy the incumbent: Chile’s Local Telephony Market," Working Papers wp194, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    17. Gaggero, Alberto A., 2007. "Regulatory risk in the utilities industry: An empirical study of the English-speaking countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 191-205, September.
    18. James E. Prieger, 2005. "Endogenous Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation," Working Papers 54, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:3:p:227-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.