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The impossibility of a desirable minimal state

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  • Dwight Lee

Abstract

The amount of control the general public exerts over government depends on accepted government procedures as determined by the political constitution and prevailing public opinion. It has not been the purpose of this paper to suggest ways of providing the public more control over government but to consider some implications of changes in that control. It is obvious that it would be desirable for the general public to have more control over political decisions; i.e., for the political process to be more responsive to the broad based benefits and costs that result from government action. The question is; what does more public control over government imply about the desirable size of government? For the natural rights advocate the answer is nothing. Government should be only large enough to protect citizens against force and fraud. The purpose of the present paper, however, has been to argue that the desirable size of government can be either positively or negatively related to the control exerted over it by the public. If this argument is accepted, it casts doubt on the possibility of a desirable minimum state. When there is little public control over government, organized special interest will have disproportionate political influence and will use this influence to expand government into activities that are detrimental to the public interest. Obviously, given this situation, it will be desirable to use additional public control over government to reduce the size of government by restricting its activities. But just as obvious is that this situation is one in which control over government is inadequate to the task of achieving a minimal state. On the other hand, whether or not control over government is sufficient to limit the size of government to its desirable level, there remains a plausible argument that this desirable level eventually begins to increase as control over government increases. It is certainly reasonable to expect that if control over government continued to increase toward that of complete control, the desirable size of government would eventually become greater than the minimum achievable state (and greater yet than the minimal state). One can doubt whether public control over government sufficient to reduce the state below desirable limits will ever be reached. It may be that the lack of control over government explains why the ideal of a minimal state is such a persistent one. The minimal state may be a fantasy that, like most fantasies, owes its appeal to the fact that it is beyond our reach. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Dwight Lee, 1989. "The impossibility of a desirable minimal state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 277-284, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:3:p:277-284
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123890
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Browning, Edgar K & Johnson, William R, 1984. "The Trade-Off between Equality and Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 175-203, April.
    2. Dwight Lee, 1987. "The tradeoff between equality and efficiency: Short-run politics and long-run realities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 149-165, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Sutter, 1997. "Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 139-150, June.
    2. Sutter, Daniel, 1998. "Constitutions and the growth of government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-142, January.
    3. J. R. Clark & Benjamin Powell, 2019. "The ‘minimal’ state reconsidered: governance on the margin," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 119-130, June.
    4. Dwight R. Lee, 1999. "In Defense of Excessive Government," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(4), pages 674-690, April.

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