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The encomienda and the optimizing imperialist: an interpretation of Spanish imperialism in the Americas

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  • Ronald Batchelder
  • Nicolas Sanchez

Abstract

During the conquest and early administration of Spain’s American colonies the most controversial policy was the granting of temporary encomiendas, or temporary rights to collect tribute from Indians, as a reward for conquest. The contribution of the encomienda to the destruction of Indian populations was recognized by Spanish authorities at the time, yet the Crown persisted in introducing the most destructive form of the institution during the early stage of each colonial venture for over 200 years. Because the Crown financed the defense of its colonial possessions against other European imperialists, an addition to colonial capital, by increasing the return to an aggressor, imposed a defense-cost externality on the Crown. Since the cost of defending additional assets was higher in the Americas than in Spain, an efficient policy would have been to encourage the rapid transformation of human services into durable assets that could be transported to Spain. According to our defense-externality argument, the temporary encomienda and its parallel modification in each colonial episode becomes a rational Crown policy. The administration of Spain’s distant colonial possessions, especially the adjustments in the restrictions on encomiendas, required information about the local conditions, and we argue that the Church, as designated “protector of the Indians,” may have played an unwitting role in the communication of information. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald Batchelder & Nicolas Sanchez, 2013. "The encomienda and the optimizing imperialist: an interpretation of Spanish imperialism in the Americas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 45-60, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:45-60
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9953-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 211-211.
    2. Batchelder, Ronald W. & Freudenberger, Herman, 1983. "On the rational origins of the modern centralized state," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-13, January.
    3. Thompson, Earl A, 1974. "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 755-782, July/Aug..
    4. Thompson, Earl A, 1979. "An Economic Basis for the "National Defense Argument" for Aiding Certain Industries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 1-36, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Paul Faguet & Camilo Matajira & Fabio Sánchez-Torres, 2022. "Constructive extraction? Encomienda, the colonial state, and development in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20105, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Clara Jace, 2019. "An economic theory of economic analysis: the case of the School of Salamanca," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 375-397, December.
    3. Faguet, Jean-Paul & Matajira, Camilo & Sánchez, Fabio, 2024. "Encomienda, the colonial state, and long-run development in Colombia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 122257, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Ennio Piano, 2020. "Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 1001-1023.
    5. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    6. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
    7. Abad, Leticia Arroyo & Maurer, Noel, 2024. "Does time heal all wounds? The rise, decline, and long-term impact of forced labor in Spanish America," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Encomienda ; Defense externality; Spanish colonial policies; F54; N36; N46; P48;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
    • N36 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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