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ABA ratings: what do they really measure?

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  • John Lott

Abstract

This study reveals the ABA as systematically giving lower ratings to Republican circuit court nominees, although no similar bias appears to exist for district court nominees. The data show how important it is to separate the evidence for circuit and district court nominees. This study fits in with my previous research showing that it is the brightest nominees who face the most difficult time getting confirmed and that the most difficult confirmations involve circuit court nominees. One difference with earlier findings is that the biases seem to be hidden and are worse than looking at the averages across administrations. For example, the oldest Republican nominees, who will not be on the court for long, receive the highest ratings. The reverse is true for Democratic nominees. Similarly, the research explains why Republican nominees tend to get their lowest evaluations from the ABA when the Democrats control the Senate. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • John Lott, 2013. "ABA ratings: what do they really measure?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 139-161, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:139-161
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9912-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lott, John R, Jr & Fremling, Gertrud M, 1989. "Time Dependent Information Costs, Price Controls, and Successive Government Intervention," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 293-306, Fall.
    2. Christensen, Robert K. & Szmer, John, 2011. "Examining the Efficiency of the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Pathologies and Prescriptions," IEL Working Papers 4, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
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    6. John R. Lott, Jr., 1999. "Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 127-157, December.
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