Executive veto power and credit claiming
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References listed on IDEAS
- James M. Snyder, 2005. "Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 153-178, April.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
- Schap, David, 1990. "Executive Veto and Spending Limitation: Positive Political Economy with Implications for Institutional Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 239-256, June.
- Crain, W Mark & Leavens, Donald R & Tollison, Robert D, 1986. "Final Voting in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 833-841, September.
More about this item
KeywordsVeto bargaining; Package veto; Line-item veto; Agenda setting; C72; D72; D78;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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