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Bureaucratic incentives, path dependence, and foreign aid: An empirical institutional analysis of irrigation in the Philippines

  • Eduardo Araral

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    At least 25 developing countries are embarking on irrigation governance reforms to address the persistent problem of poor irrigation performance. Some scholars suggest that the patterns of construction, deterioration, rehabilitation, and modernization commonly found among irrigation agencies in these countries are rational because of the time inconsistency problem of information. I argue instead, using panel data from the Philippines, that the problem of poor performance is linked to inherent incentive problems faced by public bureaucracies, how these incentives became entrenched in the path dependence of irrigation development, and how these were reinforced by incentives embedded in irrigation aid, particularly by the moral hazard problem and the fungibility of irrigation aid. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11077-005-2309-2
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Policy Sciences.

    Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 2 (September)
    Pages: 131-157

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:policy:v:38:y:2005:i:2:p:131-157
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    1. Subramanian, A. & Jagannathan, N.V. & Meinzen-Dick, R., 1997. "User Organizations for Sustainable Water Services," Papers 354, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    2. Vermillion, D. L., 1997. "Impacts of irrigation management transfer: a review of the evidence," IWMI Books, Reports H020352, International Water Management Institute.
    3. Collier, Paul, 1999. "Aid 'Dependency': A Critique," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 8(4), pages 528-45, December.
    4. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1989. "Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 53-82, Spring.
    5. Gibson, Clark C. & Andersson, Krister & Ostrom, The late Elinor & Shivakumar, Sujai, 2005. "The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199278855, March.
    6. Wijayaratna, C. M. & Vermillion, D. L., 1994. "Irrigation management turnover in the Philippines: Strategy of the National Irrigation Administration," IWMI Books, Reports H014218, International Water Management Institute.
    7. Merrey, Douglas.J, 1996. "Institutional design principles for accountability in large irrigation systems," IWMI Research Reports H 19766, International Water Management Institute.
    8. Merrey, D. J., 1996. "Institutional design principles for accountability in large irrigation systems," IWMI Books, Reports H019766, International Water Management Institute.
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