New Financial Architectures and Legal Infrastructures: Toward a Corrected and Compensated International Monetary System
The international monetary system features a powerful subsystem of nations with an organized polyarchic economy—in other words, a market economy adjusted and balanced by government authorities to protect the market against forces operating within it but failing to abide by the rules (as in the defense of fair competition), in which excessive asymmetry runs the risk of toppling the system. The central bank is the body guaranteeing both stability and the system. However, globalization prevents the central banks from controlling the massive flows of derivatives. In the absence of a supranational authority, the only remedy realistically feasible today lies in the network of informal agreements among the leading economic powers—the G-7, G-8, and G-20 countries. These countries, on the one hand, intervene on a case-by-case (or crisis-by-crisis) basis and, on the other, strive to bring chaotic corrective and compensatory measures into a market dominated by “turbocapitalism” to ward off future crises. Their actions thus strengthen legal infrastructures and the information flows that ensure transparency and involve financially sound nations, weak nations, international organizations, assorted classes of operators, and major private institutions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
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Volume (Year): 11 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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- Robert Aliber, 2000. "Capital Flows, Exchange Rates, and the New International Financial Architecture: Six Financial Crises in Search of a Generic Explanation," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 43-61, August.
- Michele Fratianni, 2000. "Comment on Aliber's “Capital Flows, Exchange Rates, and the New International Financial Architecture: Six Financial Crises in Search of a Generic Explanation”," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 63-67, August.
- David Llewellyn, 2000. "Some Lessons for Regulation from Recent Bank Crises," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-109, August.
- Maria Malaguti, 2000. "Private-Law Instruments for Reduction of Risks on International Financial Markets: Results and Limits of Self-Regulation," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 247-257, August.
- Paolo Savona & Aurelio Maccario & Chiara Oldani, 2000. "On Monetary Analysis of Derivatives," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 149-175, August.
- Paolo Savona & Aurelio Maccario, 1998. "On the Relation between Money and Derivatives and its Application to the International Monetary Market," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 637-664, January.
- Sergio Carbone, 2000. "Financial Derivatives and Private International Law: Some Remarks," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 235-245, August.
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