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Financial conditions and supply decisions when firms are risk averse

Author

Listed:
  • Vanda Tulli

    (Università di Milano-Bicocca)

  • Mauro Gallegati

    (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona)

  • Gerd Weinrich

    (Catholic University of Milan)

Abstract

Extending earlier work by Greenwald and Stiglitz (Q J Econ 108:77–114, 1993) on the role of a firm’s equity position and bankruptcy costs in determining its production decision we show that, even if bankruptcy costs are ignored, a firm’s decision makers’ risk aversion, whether they are owner-entrepreneurs or hired managers, can give rise to the same results. What is more, we argue that, in the presence of risk aversion, increased variance of the output price affects a firm’s supply decision as the sum of an impact and an indirect effect. Under reasonable assumptions the impact effect prevails and then output decreases. We show this to hold for risk attitudes represented both by CARA and by CRRA utility functions. Finally, we explore the dynamics of the equity base. We provide examples in which the accumulation of net worth slows down as a consequence of an increase of risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Vanda Tulli & Mauro Gallegati & Gerd Weinrich, 2019. "Financial conditions and supply decisions when firms are risk averse," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 259-289, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:128:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-019-00655-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-019-00655-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Portfolio possibilities locus; Financing gap; Net worth; Price volatility; Risk aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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