IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/itaxpf/v6y1999i1p89-99.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Scale Economies in Cross-Border Shopping and Commodity Taxation

Author

Listed:
  • Kimberley Scharf

Abstract

A simple inventory theoretic model of cross-border shopping with transaction and storage costs is developed. Consumers incur fixed transaction and transportation costs to access the foreign market in which a perfect substitute of the domestic good is available. We show that the size of the optimal tax is inversely related to the size of domestic transactions. This result provides a simple example of a more general principle, that is, when there are increasing returns to scale in tax avoidance with respect to the quantities involved, then smaller transactions should be taxed more heavily than larger transactions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • Kimberley Scharf, 1999. "Scale Economies in Cross-Border Shopping and Commodity Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(1), pages 89-99, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:6:y:1999:i:1:p:89-99
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008652004940
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008652004940
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1008652004940?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1991. "Tax competition and tax coordination : when countries differ in size," Policy Research Working Paper Series 738, The World Bank.
    2. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    3. Harry Huizinga & Søren Bo Nielsen, "undated". "The Taxation of Interest in Europe: A Minimum Withholding Tax?," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-13, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Christiansen, Vidar, 1994. " Cross-Border Shopping and the Optimum Commodity Tax in a Competitive and a Monopoly Market," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(3), pages 329-341.
    5. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Aiura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2019. "Indirect taxes in a cross-border shopping model: a monopolistic competition approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(2), pages 147-175, October.
    2. Ghoddusi, Hamed & Rafizadeh, Nima & Rahmati, Mohammad H., 2018. "Price elasticity of gasoline smuggling: A semi-structural estimation approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 171-185.
    3. Esteller-Moré, Alejandro & Rizzo, Leonzio, 2011. "(Uncontrolled) Aggregate Shocks or Vertical Tax Interdependence? Evidence From Gasoline and Cigarettes," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(2), pages 353-379, June.
    4. Aiura, Hiroshi & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2013. "Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 30-38.
    5. Bas Spierings & Martin Van Der Velde, 2008. "Shopping, Borders And Unfamiliarity: Consumer Mobility In Europe," Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG, vol. 99(4), pages 497-505, September.
    6. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Anastasios Rizos, 2020. "Optimal tax policy under tax evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 339-362, April.
    7. Leonzio Rizzo, 2008. "Local government responsiveness to federal transfers: theory and evidence," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(3), pages 316-337, June.
    8. Leal, Andrés & López-Laborda, Julio & Rodrigo, Fernando, 2009. "Prices, taxes and automotive fuel cross-border shopping," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 225-234.
    9. Leonzio Rizzo, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.
    10. repec:kap:iaecre:v:16:y:2010:i:2:p:135-148 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Ramsey Doug & Thimm Tatanja & Hehn Leonie, 2019. "Cross-border Shopping Tourism: A Switzerland-Germany Case Study," European Journal of Tourism, Hospitality and Recreation, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 3-17, May.
    12. Andrés Leal & Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo, 2010. "Cross-Border Shopping: A Survey," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 16(2), pages 135-148, May.
    13. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2005. "Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 5334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Leonzio Rizzo, 2009. "(Uncontrolled) Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidence from gasoline and cigarettes," Working Papers 2009/24, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jørgen Aasness & Odd Erik Nygård, 2009. "Revenue functions and Dupuit curves for indirect taxes with cross-border shopping," Discussion Papers 573, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    2. Ben Lockwood & Giuseppe Migali, 2009. "Did The Single Market Cause Competition in Excise Taxes? Evidence From EU Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 406-429, March.
    3. Leal, Andrés & López-Laborda, Julio & Rodrigo, Fernando, 2009. "Prices, taxes and automotive fuel cross-border shopping," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 225-234.
    4. Ohsawa, Yoshiaki, 2003. "A spatial tax harmonization model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 443-459, June.
    5. Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "Paternalism and Tax Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 125-149, March.
    6. repec:kap:iaecre:v:16:y:2010:i:2:p:135-148 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Andrés Leal & Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo, 2010. "Cross-Border Shopping: A Survey," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 16(2), pages 135-148, May.
    8. Ramsey Doug & Thimm Tatanja & Hehn Leonie, 2019. "Cross-border Shopping Tourism: A Switzerland-Germany Case Study," European Journal of Tourism, Hospitality and Recreation, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 3-17, May.
    9. Saša Ranđelović & Milica Bisić, 2021. "Excise duties harmonisation and smoking in a model with cross-border arbitrage," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 507-532, May.
    10. Jan Jacobs & Jenny Ligthart & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(3), pages 271-294, June.
    11. IREGUI, Ana María & Ligia Melo & Jorge Ramos, 2005. "El impuesto predial en Colombia: factores explicativos del recaudo," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, June.
    12. Morten Hvidt & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2001. "Non‐cooperative vs. Minimum‐Rate Commodity Taxation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(4), pages 315-326, November.
    13. Agrawal, David R. & Trandel, Gregory A., 2019. "Dynamics of policy adoption with state dependence," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    14. Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 2003. "Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 10051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Bernd Genser & Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax competition, tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 59-89, February.
    16. Keuschnigg, Christian & Loretz, Simon & Winner, Hannes, 2014. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union: A Survey," Working Papers in Economics 2014-4, University of Salzburg.
    17. Leon Bettendorf & Joeri Gorter & Albert van der Horst, 2006. "Who benefits from tax competition in the European Union?," CPB Document 125, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    18. Lockwood, Ben, 2001. "Tax competition and tax co-ordination under destination and origin principles: a synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 279-319, August.
    19. Michael Keen & Jenny E. Ligthart, 2007. "Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 487-504, September.
    20. Wolfgang Eggert & Andreas Haufler, 1998. "When Do Small Countries Win Tax Wars?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(4), pages 327-361, July.
    21. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:6:y:1999:i:1:p:89-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.