Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Volume (Year): 14 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
- Michael Keen, 1998.
"Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
- Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 97/173, International Monetary Fund.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," IFS Working Papers W96/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikström, 2001. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers in a Multilevel Public Sector," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(2), pages 158-158, February.
- Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1987. "The suboptimality of local taxation under two-tier fiscal federalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 407-411. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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