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Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

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  • David Granlund

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Abstract

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • David Granlund, 2007. "Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(4), pages 503-524, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:4:p:503-524
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9028-x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-007-9028-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1987. "The suboptimality of local taxation under two-tier fiscal federalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 407-411.
    2. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
    3. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    4. Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikström, 2001. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers in a Multilevel Public Sector," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(2), pages 158-158, February.
    5. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Granlund, 2010. "The effect of health care expenditure on sickness absence," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(6), pages 555-568, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic federation; Moral hazard; Vertical fiscal externalities; Sickness absence; Sickness benefits; H2; H4; H7;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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